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Abstract
The current political administration in Bolivia has become one of the most
prominent actors in the global climate justice movement that seeks to establish equality
and reduce vulnerability in an era of anthropogenic climate change. An overwhelming
resistance to ineffective neoliberal policies implemented by global governance
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the 1980s
and 1990s delivered a new administration headed by Evo Morales, Bolivia's first
indigenous president since its inception as a nation state in 1825. Evo brought with him
promises for radical progressive change centered around decolonization, economic
redistribution, renewal and affirmation of Bolivian indigenous values, and a departure
from the global capitalist system that historically has subjugated Bolivia’s people and
natural resources to extreme exploitation. His commitments are reflected in the aims of
climate justice, a movement that has recently taken hold amongst groups that recognize
the harsh realities of climate change and the disproportionate impacts that will inevitably
occur due to preexisting social inequality. However, despite Evo’s proclaimed objectives,
the Bolivian government remains heavily dependent on resource extraction to fuel its
initiatives, and has continued to engage in the very capitalistic practices that Evo has
condemned for bringing his country ruin. In the following thesis, I flesh out this
contradiction and address the barriers Bolivia faces to pursuing climate justice through an
analysis of domestic and foreign factors at play.
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Preface
I would like to start this thesis with an overview of my experiences in Bolivia that
led to my interest in the South American country and its efforts toward climate justice.
During the fall of 2017, I embarked on an International Honors Program through the
School of International Training entitled “Climate Change: The Politics of Food, Water,
and Energy.” The program took me to Vietnam, Morocco, and Bolivia in order to
investigate the climatic factors at play and the sociopolitical responses enacted in each
context by civil society, academics, and government officials. The countries were
selected by the program using a set of criteria that assessed each country’s climate
vulnerability and the approaches utilized by each to counteract detrimental climate
effects. All three countries are deemed highly vulnerable to impending climate changes
due largely to environmental setting, but Bolivia presents a unique response to the
climate crisis based in indigenous cosmology and defiance to the Western order. Our
program culminated in Bolivia, where we had the opportunity to visit governmental sites
in La Paz, witness the ancient Tiwanaku ruins, spend time with an Aymara community on
the shores of Lake Titicaca, and reside with a Bolivian host family in Cochabamba.
Through course readings, site visits, community interactions, and engagement with
Bolivian activists, academics, and government officials, I was able to gain intimate
insights into Bolivian life and politics under president Evo Morales. The people I met in
Bolivia are still incredibly close to my heart, and in many instances, have contributed
immensely to this project. I was inspired by the people I met and the climate approaches I
was introduced to, and in writing this thesis, I hope to honor their contributions to my
learning.
Upon returning to Bates, I came to realize that my academic background in
Global Environmental Politics left me well situated to investigate the politics of climate
justice in Bolivia. By using my academic regimen in tandem with my experiences in
Bolivia, I have developed a thesis that I feel best reflects my time in school while also
contributing to the existing literature.
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Introduction
There exists an ongoing debate about the financial crisis, climate change and
democracy. We cannot forget the food and energy crises. I applaud the addresses,
which focus on the origins of the crisis. However, the majority of the speeches
only speak of effects, never the cause. I came here today to speak plainly with you
all. The origin of this crisis is the exaggerated accumulation of capital in far too
few hands. It is the permanent removal of natural resources and the
commercialization of Mother Earth. The origins come from the system and an
economic model of Capitalism. If we don’t share the truth of this crisis with one
another nor the international community, we will disseminate a lie to our people
who expect more from their presidents, governments and these kinds of forums
(Morales 2008).
So spoke Evo Morales, Bolivia’s first indigenous president, while addressing the
64th General Assembly of the United Nations in 2008. Though he had been president for
less than three years at the time of the address, he had already emerged on the global
stage as a radical champion of social justice and climate resilience. Time and time again,
Morales utilized his platform to chide the international community for their complicity in
environmentally degrading practices, urging leaders worldwide to acknowledge their role
in perpetuating climate change and income inequality. His views were endorsed by a
majority of Bolivian residents, as shown by his overwhelming electoral victory in 2005.
Morales and his party, Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), garnered the highest proportion
of the national vote since Bolivia’s return to democracy in the early 1980s, reflecting
Bolivia’s commitment to indigenous values and ideals (Postero 2017, 1).
Morales’s election was the result of concentrated indigenous activism that had
erupted under previous administrations in response to increasing privatization and
commodification of common resources such as water and gas. The formerly colonized
country had long been under the jurisdiction of white mestizo elites, but under the duress
of extreme poverty and social inequality, residents coalesced around indigeneity to
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mobilize a long-oppressed social base. As 62 percent of the adult population selfidentified as indigenous in the 2001 census, Morales offered the first proportionate
political representation in Bolivia’s history as a nation state (Postero 2017, 10). The
victory for indigenous Bolivians was not merely a symbolic one, however. Morales came
into office with a campaign platform that injected indigenous values into a political arena
that had formerly reflected the views of white mestizo elites. With the MAS comprising a
relative majority of parliament seats, Morales was able to actualize the demands of
indigenous activist groups by creating a new constitution in 2009, establishing Bolivia as
a “communitarian, plurinational state” with the primary focus of the state being to
“constitute a just and harmonious society, cemented in decolonization, without
discrimination or exploitation, with full social justice, to consolidate plurinational
identities” (Contitute Assembly 2009; Postero 2017, 2). The new constitution articulates
indigenous values revolving around environmental protection, social equality, communal
practices, access to education, and opposition to “capitalistic practices” of
commodification and privatization (Constitutional Assembly 2009). These tenets are
embodied in the motto “vivir bien,” or “living well,” which has become the slogan of the
indigenous activist groups in South America (Postero 2017, 65-66). With this legislation,
Bolivia came to represent a voice of the Global South diametrically opposed to the
Western development paradigm.
Bolivia’s push for indigenous recognition is not a new global phenomenon, but it
has been one of the most successful movements in terms of implementing indigenous
policy on a national scale (Mander 2005, 9). With the Morales government still in place,
Bolivia heads an increasingly visible global indigenous coalition seeking to lessen the
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negative consequences of globalization and extractavist practices for the 350 million
remaining indigenous people across the globe (Mander 2005, 3). The damage wrought
upon indigenous communities as a result of colonialism and ensuing social, economic,
and environmental oppression is well documented, but while globalization stemming
from colonial structures has subjugated indigenous people to oppressive conditions, it has
also provided a platform for coalition building and knowledge sharing amongst disparate
indigenous groups. Morales has utilized that platform by vocalizing and projecting
formerly silenced indigenous cosmologies and practices that run counter to the economic
world order.
A distinct commonality between various indigenous groups is the intimate
knowledge of the land developed through continued dependence on surrounding natural
features for sustenance (Berkes 1999; Canessa 2012; Macas 2005; Mohawk 2005; TauliCorpuz 2005). While such generalization can be damaging if applied indiscriminately
across all indigenous groups, it serves as a framework through which to understand the
tension between global economic thinking and indigenous practices. UN Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, writes about the
ways in which indigenous worldviews stem from usufruct land-use systems and
communal forms of living that allowed societies to flourish within contained ecosystems.
Environmental sustainability was essential to ensuring that the land on which indigenous
communities resided remained habitable and nourishing prior to the advent of exportoriented production. For these reasons, the individualism and privatization that
accompany the current global economic system are antithetical to indigenous ways of life
(Tauli-Corpuz 2005, 15).
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In light of the dire warnings recently published in the 2017 report “Global
Warming of 1.5 ºC” conducted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), consideration of alternative modes of production and global sustenance become
ever more imperative (IPCC 2018). Extractivist practices and unchecked production are
clearly not sustainable modes of living, but the global economy has yet to halt a
precipitous decline into climate instability. As populations around the globe begin to feel
the pressures of climate change, the discourse of climate mitigation has moved rapidly
from future projections to harsh contemporary realities. The leisure to discuss climate
change mitigation has been overshadowed in many vulnerable areas by the urgent need to
implement climate change adaptations before lives are destroyed. As in most instances of
vulnerability, the disenfranchised face elevated risks, while the privileged are insulated
by economic latitude. Jean Palutikof, director of the National Climate Change Adaptation
Research facility, calls adaptation the “poor cousin of the climate change challenge,”
noting its prevalence in subaltern discourse as hegemonic world powers discuss climate
mitigation at an arm’s length while continuing to engage in deleterious trends of
consumption (Palutikof 2009, 3). As these trends continue, it is important to analyze the
objectives of an indigenous led nation such as Bolivia.
The indigenous driven messaging that has emanated from the Bolivian
administration since 2006 emphasizes the importance of climate justice- a response to
climate change that incorporates adaptation and mitigation while actively seeking to
reduce inequalities exacerbated by climate pressures. Climate justice was borne of global
justice movements throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s that sought to address apparent and
increasing inequalities perpetuated by the powerful players in the global marketplace
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(Bond 2012, 17). First labeled in 1999, climate justice emerged as a movement
articulating the disproportionate impacts of climate change according to pre-existing
vulnerabilities created by historical inequalities (Widdick 2018). The concept highlights
the struggles of marginalized groups and demands reparations for climate injustices
wrought by wealthy, high-emitting countries. The lineage of climate justice contains
many actors, most of which represent the Global South, but Bolivia has been especially
prominent due to Evo’s vociferous admonitions of Western practices, the new
constitution that reflects anti-colonial, pro-earth sentiments, and the organization of a
climate conference that would ultimately solidify the identity of the climate justice
movement.
The climate justice approach was championed in the 2010 event organized by
Morales called “The World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of
Mother Earth.” Morales organized the event to express his distaste for the mechanisms
used by the global community to reduce climate change through tenuous emissions
reduction commitments and the commodification of carbon. After Conference of Parties
(COP) 15 in Copenhagen in December of 2009 produced uninspiring results, Morales
invited indigenous groups, government representatives, and social activist movements
from 140 countries to Cochabamba, Bolivia for the World People’s Conference in order
to develop more systemic and holistic climate solutions (Postero 2017, 91). Morales’s
opening statement left no doubts as to his intentions:
We are here because in Copenhagen, the so-called developed countries failed in
their obligation to provide substantial commitments to reduce greenhouse gases.
We have two paths: either Pachamama or death. Either capitalism lives or Mother
Earth lives. Of course, brothers and sisters, we are here for life, for humanity, and
for the rights of Mother Earth. Long live the rights of Mother Earth! Death to
capitalism! (Postero 2017, 91).
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Morales’s harsh critiques of capitalism extend even to climate change solutions,
and his rhetoric amplifies the paradigm differences between Bolivia’s indigenous people
and the industrialized world. Bolivian Ambassador Pablo Solon articulated Bolivia’s
commitment to climate justice after the World People’s Conference by saying: “we
believe the issue is much bigger than just commitments and targets, and that those
considering human rights breaches are correct” (World People’s Conference on Climate
Change and the Rights of Mother Earth 2011). The World People’s Agreement that was
created at the Conference assumed a similar tone. The Agreement begins with a critique
of capitalism, stating that “under capitalism, Mother Earth is converted into a source of
raw materials, and human beings into consumers and a means of production, into people
that are seen as valuable only for what they own, and not for what they are” (World
People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth 2010). The
document also notes that the logic of competition, progress, and limitless growth has
been imposed upon all by the capitalist world economy, and suggests that the resulting
concentration of capital has led directly to climate change and its injurious effects. The
nexus of the argument is encapsulated in the pointed sentence: “[Capitalism] is an
imperialist system of colonization of the planet” (World People’s Conference on Climate
Change and the Rights of Mother Earth 2010) (See full text of the World People’s
Agreement in Appendix I).
Morales endorses the principles developed at the World People’s Summit that will
guide the creation of a more egalitarian economic system, presented in the following
form within the text of the World People’s Agreement:
●

harmony and balance among all and with all things;
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●
●
●
●
●
●

complementarity, solidarity, and equality;
collective well-being and the satisfaction of the basic necessities of all;
people in harmony with nature;
recognition of human beings for what they are, not what they own;
elimination of all forms of colonialism, imperialism and interventionism;
peace among the peoples and with Mother Earth; (World People’s
Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth 2010)

This list embodies the aims of climate justice and seeks to ensure the well-being of all
above corporate interest and economic benefit.
However, as the Morales administration has developed, discrepancies have
surfaced between the president’s international messaging and his domestic policies
(Aguirre and Cooper 2010). While Morales lectures the world on the continued
commodification of nature, his administration has remained dependent upon natural
resource extraction. Social anthropologist John-Andrew McNeish argues that despite the
country’s progressive indigenous government, Bolivia is just as likely as Peru or Ecuador
to prioritize national industry over indigenous rights (McNeish 2013). Such a claim is
substantiated by Morales’s response to indigenous activist groups protesting a
development project to build a highway through the Isoboro Sécure National Park and
Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS) (See Chapter 3), a biodiverse tropical preserve in the
Bolivia lowlands that is home to sixty-three indigenous communities (Postero 2017, 122).
“La Chaparina,” the police raid outside of Yucumo in September of 2011, has become
notorious for its brutality against indigenous protesters. The Morales-directed raid
exposed the administration’s paradoxical contradictions surrounding liberal forms of
development (McNeish 2013).
Political scientist Jeffery Webber argues that Bolivia’s economic model under
Morales is not in fact a departure from neoliberal economics, but rather can be
characterized as “reconstituted neoliberalism,” essentially capitalizing on free market
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mechanisms under the veil of progressive socialism (Webber 2011, 177). With few
structural changes to Bolivia’s economic system under Morales, oil and gas extraction
rose from 4.5 percent of Bolivia’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 1999 to 6.9 percent
in 2007 (Webber 2011, 193). This trend is in keeping with Bolivia’s Plan de Desarrollo
Nacional 2006–2010 (National Development Plan, PDN), which was released in 2006.
The PDN was rooted in the maintenance of extractive industry in Bolivia, ensuring that
Bolivia would remain dependent on fossil fuels and mineral resources extending to the
indefinite future (Webber 2011, 192). Latin American scholars such as Eduardo Gudynas
have identified Bolivia’s economic model as “progressive extractivism,” a system that
depends upon resource extraction and exportation for funding, yet uses those funds to
reduce income inequality and boost social programs within the country (Gudynas, 2010).
In order to make good on his promises to the people of Bolivia, Morales and his
administration required a source of national income that would enable the employment of
social programs. Morales stepped into a government that had long been reliant on natural
resource extraction, and as such, has facilitated extractive practices despite his
international perception as a champion of Mother Earth (Aguirre and Cooper 2010).
It appears that Morales chose the politically expedient route in continuing
Bolivia’s dependence on extractive industries. However, the extent to which Morales is
constrained by a global system of resource extraction and commodification is worthy of
investigation. Bolivia has a long legacy of resource extraction, dictated in large part by
colonial power dynamics that have since manifested in neocolonial trade relationships
with larger countries such as the U.S (Kohl and Farthing 2006). Those relationships are
facilitated through intergovernmental organizations that influence the flow of goods and
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services between countries; namely the World Bank, the World Trade organization
(WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These three institutions were all
created by the international community following World War II in order to establish
funds for development and to serve as a mediating force in the global economy. Political
geographer Richard Peet identifies the triad as “global governance institutions” in order
to convey their role in overseeing the global interactions (2009, 100). Those critical of the
organizations have derided them for their hand in perpetuating global income inequality
and creating conditions favorable to more powerful countries. Peet refers to the three
institutions as “the unholy trinity,” citing the non-democratic fashion by which they were
created and the equally non-democratic mechanisms that have maintained global power
dynamics in favor of countries such as the US that benefit from reduced regulation in
global trade (2003, 11). Jerry Mander, American activist and author, echoes those
unfavorable sentiments by calling the global governance institutions “global corporate
instruments,” alluding to their affiliation with powerful countries and the corporations
that accumulate wealth for those countries (Mander 2005, 5).
Others, such as renowned economist Jeffrey Sachs, argue that multilateral
development banks such as the World Bank have enormous upsides, with potential to
stimulate sustainable development and poverty reduction through liberal market
methodology (Sachs 2005). In an editorial he wrote for the Washington Post defending
his credentials for World Bank President consideration, Sachs calls the World Bank “a
powerhouse of ideas and a meeting ground for key actors who together can solve
daunting problems of poverty, hunger, disease and environmental degradation” (Sachs
2012). The IMF and the WTO are corollary institutions with similar ambitions predicated
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upon the sustenance of a liberal market economy. University of Sydney political
philosophy professor Duncan Ivison argues that a humanitarian form of postcolonial
liberalism is entirely plausible, and that the institutions that mediate such a system have
the potential to facilitate structural changes that would enable indigenous groups to
participate meaningfully in the global economy (Ivison 2002). Both Sachs and Ivison
indicate that current economic inequalities did not result from a liberal world economy
that champions capitalism, but rather from human mistakes in the past that failed to
account for all people (Ivison 2002, 34).
It is evident that Bolivia engages with both internal and external factors that
determine the actions of the Bolivian administration A thorough analysis of domestic and
international influences will help to illuminate Bolivia’s role in producing climate change
resolutions and the inhibiting factors the country faces its pursuit of climate justice. By
assessing Bolivia’s contributions to the climate justice movement under Evo Morales and
investigating the international factors that delimit the efficacy of Bolivia’s push for global
climate recognition, the barriers that are faced by Bolivia and other similarly situated
countries can be identified and addressed. In performing such an analysis, I will strive to
examine historical, political, economic, and environmental factors that have played a role
in determining Bolivia’s climate vulnerability and its ensuing efforts at climate
fortification utilizing a climate justice framework. This involves looking at Evo
Morales’s policies and practices, determining the successes and failures of his tenure,
examining the international factors that have created the contemporary economic and
political world order, and seeking an understanding of the global processes that have
sought climate change resolution.
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This thesis investigates the relationship between the indigenous-led Bolivian
government and the global economy in order to ascertain the obstacles to climate justice
that have arisen since Bolivia has emerged onto the national stage as a figurehead of
resistance to international economic practices. Ultimately, this work will examine
Bolivia’s efforts toward climate justice and the government’s convoluted relationship
with the global economy, identifying the major barriers to the attainment of climate
justice on a domestic and international scale.
In the coming chapters, I investigate several key questions that indicate gaps in
the existing literature. What role does Bolivia play in the climate justice movement? How
has the Morales administration aided or hindered climate justice ambitions? To what
extent do global processes affect the ability of the Morales government to realize climate
justice? What barriers exist to the pursuit of climate justice, and how have they
manifested in contemporary global politics? I address these questions in the following
chapters through an analysis that incorporates extensive literature review, interviews with
Bolivian academics, on-site observations and learnings, and investigation into the policy
positions of the Bolivian administration, indigenous activist groups, and global
governance institutions.
The thesis is organized in a fashion such that contemporary Bolivian politics and
key themes such as climate justice, neoliberalism, and climate vulnerability are laid as a
foundation prior to a discussion of broader systems with which Bolivia has historically
interacted. Chapter One outlines Bolivia’s more recent political history, with a particular
focus on the Morales government and the indigenous actions that led to the election of
Bolivia’s first indigenous president. This overview includes past tensions between global
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governance institution initiatives in Bolivia and responses by indigenous activists. The
chapter articulates the proclaimed objectives of the MAS and the Morales administration
and presents the successes and shortcomings of Morales’s tenure. I highlight rhetoric of
indigenous activist groups and juxtapose it against the extractive practices that fuel
Bolivia’s economy. Further, I analyze Morales’s international rhetoric, and investigate
the contradictions implicit in his stance against capitalism despite reliance on extractive
industries begins to be fleshed out. Finally, I provide key definitions and origins of words
and concepts used to describe the global world economy and responses to climate change
that will be used in later chapters.
In Chapter Two, I provide an informative chronology of Bolivia’s colonial history
and its deeply rooted extractivism, extending through major events within the last few
centuries. Included within this history is an overview of indigenous presence and
practices pertaining to climate justice and social resilience. This history will serve as a
foundation upon which to build an understanding of Bolivia’s colonial legacies and
political and economic structures that have arisen through a history of exploitation and
oppression. Finally, in Chapter Two I offer a summation of climate related factors in
Bolivia and the projections that have originated from climate studies that portend
devastating effects in the near future if climate action is not taken soon.
In Chapter Three, I illuminate the structures of the global economy, focusing on
the development of the Western order and the triad of global governance institutions that
play a crucial role in orchestrating international relations. The history of these institutions
and their subsidiaries in relation to Bolivia are considered, as are their future projects
pertaining to development and climate change solutions. In this chapter, I will also
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provide a deeper examination of Evo’s policies and the mechanisms he has used to
elevate Bolivia’s economy and reduce climate vulnerability amongst his citizenry.
Chapter Four allows the trajectories of previous chapters to intertwine, applying
Evo’s critiques of capitalism and globalization to the Western order and its institutions
and discussing the relationship between Bolivia’s government and the global economy.
This chapter considers global development from several vantage points, seeking to
uncover the real impacts of projects employed by global governance institutions and
facilitated by wealthy nations. Discussion encompasses themes of neocolonialism,
international attempts at climate resolution, historical and contemporary dependency, the
lineage of climate justice, and Bolivia’s paradoxical climate justice positionality.
Ultimately, this chapter will synthesize information from previous chapters to present the
barriers that Bolivia faces in pursuing climate justice and the reasons for which Bolivia
represents an ideal case study for the assessment of global climate issues.
The conclusion reiterates findings and states the results of this research. Potential
for future work is outlined, and limitations of the thesis are acknowledged and assessed.
Finally, the findings of the study are applied to global processes involving tensions
between historically marginalized people and the global economy, with a particular focus
on steps toward global climate justice despite apparent barriers.

15

Chapter One
The Convergence of Indigenous Resistance and Climate Justice
Bolivia’s political and environmental setting along with its recent ambitions
toward climate justice situate the country as an informative case study through which to
understand global processes of climate change and the power dynamics at play in seeking
climate resolution. This chapter will elucidate the processes of change that led to Evo’s
presidency, with a focus on the indigenous activism that opposed neoliberal reforms
imposed upon Bolivia by global governance institutions. I will begin to uncover the
policies that Morales has implemented since assuming the presidency and speak to the
ways in which Evo’s aims align with those of climate justice. This analysis coincides
with an assessment of the neoliberal policies that were implemented throughout the 1980s
and 1990s that led to widespread activism and ultimately pitted the current Bolivian
administration against the US-led Western order. I will further provide an overview of
climate vulnerability and the components that exacerbate climate pressures in Bolivia,
pointing to the global inequalities that have precipitated disproportionate climate impacts.
Ultimately, this chapter will present Bolivia’s contemporary political setting and the
tensions that have arisen from opposition to Western practices.
Evo Morales did not become the first indigenous president of Bolivia through
sheer coincidence. Rather, he was buoyed by a legacy of indigenous activism that extends
back through colonial times, but became especially visible on a global stage through
resistance to globalization and neoliberalism within the past few decades. Anthropologist
Nancy Postero identifies 1985 as the point at which Bolivia entered the “neoliberal era,”
and, consequently, the point at which indigenous groups began to organize to resist
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internationally imposed neoliberal policies (Postero 2017, 28). Bolivia’s return to
democracy from a military dictatorship occurred in 1982, at which time Bolivians
suffered from extreme poverty, particularly in indigenous populations (Postero 2017, 28).
The transition to democracy was marked by international economic restructuring efforts
facilitated by the IMF and the World Bank (Postero 2017, 29). These efforts came in the
form of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) that sought to revitalize ailing economies
through loans that were conditional upon the recipient’s adherence to advised World
Bank and IMF economic policies: liberalizing markets, privatizing natural resource
industries, and cutting tariffs and trade restrictions (Kohl and Farthing 2014, 28). The
intent of the SAPs was to stabilize the economies of failing developing states, and to
some extent, the objectives in Bolivia were met. Inflation, estimated at twenty-five
thousand percent in 1985, dropped to zero within months, and the IMF and World Bank
lauded Bolivia as a triumph of neoliberal restructuring efforts (Kohl and Farthing 2014,
28). A Bolivian population that was constituted of only 41.3 percent urban residents in
1975 became 69 percent urbanized by the early 2000s, and the profit-driven
individualism that characterizes capitalist economies set in to a previously communal
culture (Webber 2011, 15-16). Though economic indicators pointed to the success of
SAPs early after their implementation, the results of the very same policies would prove
to be overwhelmingly ineffective at poverty reduction and economic growth.

Neoliberalism and Indigeneity
Neoliberalism and indigeneity are critical to shaping an understanding of the
political and economic dynamics in Bolivia. In academic discourse surrounding Bolivia,

17
the two are presented as polar opposites along an economic spectrum, with neoliberalism
representing the antithesis to indigenous ideals (Kohl and Farthing 2006; Postero 2017;
McNeish 2013). While this is true in many instances, it is important to flesh out the
existing relationship in order to better appreciate the nuances that complicate a
presupposed binary.
Neoliberalism has its roots in the classical liberal political economy outlined most
prominently by preeminent economist and philosopher Adam Smith in the 18th century
(Kohl and Farthing 2006, 15). According to liberal economic theory, one of the greatest
threats to individual freedom is the state, and as individual freedom is enshrined as the
ultimate goal of a free society, neoliberalism seeks to reduce social spending and state
intervention by transferring the responsibility of economic well-being to the private
sector (Feigenbaum and Henig 1994). Economists Frederick Hayek and Milton Friedman
are renowned for their work in outlining neoliberal theory (Jones 2012). Both are
proponents of liberal markets, which they refer to as “free,” “competitive,” or “capitalist”
(Friedman 1962; Hayek 1944). In Hayek’s acclaimed work Road to Serfdom, the
economist argues that governmental intervention represents one of the greatest threats to
individual autonomy, and points to competitive markets as the driver of social progress
and freedom (Hayek 1944). Friedman echoes his predecessor’s claims by asserting that
competitive capitalism, which undergirds neoliberal theory, is “a system of economic
freedom and a necessary condition for political freedom,” emphasizing the connection
between free markets and free societies (Friedman 1962, 4). Both authors orient their
work toward Western civilization, most embodied by the economic and political history
of the United States. More recently, political scientist Francis Fukuyama emerged into the
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spotlight through his work The End of History and the Last Man, which argues that free
market capitalism and the liberalization of markets globally will lead to the ultimate
socio-economic configuration of the world order, positing neoliberalism as the most
efficient and productive economic model the world has ever seen (Fukuyama 1992).
Indigeneity introduces a new lens to modern economic thought. Though there is
no universally accepted definition of “indigenous,” a UN report written by Martínez
Cobo prior to the establishment of a Decade for Indigenous People (1995-2004) is often
cited as one of the first and most significant definitions of indigenous (Canessa 2008). In
the report, Cobo defines indigenous people as follows: “Indigenous communities, peoples
and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and precolonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from
other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them” (Cobo
1986). This definition has been found to be problematic in some senses as it necessitates
continuity with pre-colonial societies, which may not encompass the entirety of
indigenous people globally. Responding to these criticisms, the International Labor
Organization (ILO) of the United Nations created a more inclusive definition, which
applies to “peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic
conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose
status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special
laws or regulations,” emphasizing that “self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be
regarded as a fundamental criterion” for the determination of indigeneity (ILO 1989).
Anthropologist Andrew Canessa also makes the important distinction that “one can
clearly not have a sense of indigeneity without an invasion or occupation at some point in
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time,” emphasizing that indigeneity is about history and power (Canessa 2008, 207).
These definitions lend themselves to the understanding of the tensions that exist between
indigenous people and the current economic world order, as such an order has been
dependent upon the invasion of indigenous territory and the separation of modern society
and indigenous lifestyles. A history of invasion and exploitation has resulted in
widespread marginalization of indigenous people. According to World Bank statistics,
indigenous people comprise 15 percent of the world’s extreme poor despite only
representing 5 percent of the total earth’s population (Hall and Gandolfo 2016). Wealth
discrepancies are even more drastic in rural areas, where indigenous people represent
one-third of the poor population (Hall and Gandolfo 2016).
The book Paradigm Wars: Indigenous Peoples’ Resistance to Globalization
compiled by Jerry Mander and Victoria Tauli-Corpuz offers a collection of insights into
the position of indigenous people relative to a globalizing world. Tauli-Corpuz points to
globalization and the free-market methodology that drives its processes as a form of
neocolonialism that relegates indigenous people across the globe to the status of
“obstacles” in the eyes of “industrialized peoples” (Tauli-Corpuz 2005, 14). By her
assessment, not only are neoliberal practices incentivizing the commodification and
subsequent removal of indigenous peoples’ lands and resources, they are also entirely
misaligned with indigenous ideals. Export-oriented trade, heavy resource extraction,
individualism, and privatization stand opposed to indigenous cultures worldwide that are
largely based in small-scale sustainability, communal practices, and usufruct land usage
(Berkes 1999; Canessa 2012; Macas 2005; Mohawk 2005; Tauli-Corpuz 2005).
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Evo’s indigeneity presents a new dynamic to the indigenous-neoliberal binary.
Born to an Aymara family of subsistence farmers, Evo has incorporated Andean
indigenous values into the highest office in the country, and in doing so, has redefined
Bolivian indigeneity by blurring the distinction between prevailing contemporary society
and indigenous culture. Canessa argues that indigeneity “provides [Evo’s] government
with the legitimacy to rule and a platform from which to protect the nation against
cultural and economic globalization,” asserting that indigeneity has become the
foundation of a “new nationalism” (Canessa 2012, 204). This new nationalism utilizes
Andean indigenous values, but has altered them to be more conducive to national policy.
In doing so, Evo has exacerbated the contrast between the global economy and the values
he has brought to the table, issuing his common refrain “Death to capitalism!” to
emphasize his distaste for a system that, in his view, brought his country economic ruin
(Postero 2017, 91). However, Bolivian political scientist Fernando Garcia notes that
Evo’s perception of capitalism is very essentializing, reducing an entire economic system
to a cold mechanism of neocolonialism and oppression. Further, Evo remains engaged in
an economy that is largely capitalist in nature, especially in regards to international policy
(Garcia Pers. Comm. 2018). Thus, one must acknowledge the multifaceted nature of
Bolivia’s relationship with the international community in order to understand Evo’s
positionality.
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Andean Indigenous Values
I have shown several distinct
commonalities amongst indigenous
people around the world, but Bolivia’s
circumstances
warrant
a
deeper
investigation into the Andean indigenous
practices and values from which the
current administration draws. The 2009
constitution articulates a broad range of
values arising from indigenous practices,
including but not limited to “respect and
equality for all, on principles of
sovereignty, dignity, interdependence,
solidarity, harmony, and equity in the
distribution and redistribution of the
social wealth, where the search for a
good life predominates; based on respect
for the economic, social, juridical,
political and cultural pluralism of the
inhabitants of this land; and on collective
coexistence with access to water, work,
education, health and housing for all”
(Constitute Project 2009). These themes
nucleate around the concept of “buen
vivir,” or the good life, a concept first
institutionalized in the 2008 Ecuadorian
constitution before being echoed by
Bolivia. Buen vivir is a Spanish
interpretation of common indigenous
sentiments such as the Quechua “sumak
kawsay” (good life), the Aymara “suma
qamana” (good life), and the Guarani
nandereko
(harmonious
living)
(Mercado 2017). According to the
Pachamama Alliance, an organization
that seeks to promote sustainable
practices through indigenous teachings,
the good life is ascertained through
engagement with traditional cosmologies
that revolve around equitable resource
distribution, sustainable means of
production, respect for non-human life
forms, and a worldview that focuses not
on development but rather on fulfillment

of respective needs through non-market
practices (Mercado 2017). Much of
today’s indigenous cosmology is
presented in terms of its contrasting
nature with capitalism and the Western
development paradigm, and in Bolivia,
we see that rhetoric used to depart from
Western practices that contribute to
environmental degradation and the
subjugation of indigenous people.

Figure 1: The Wiphala flag, representing
the indigenous peoples of the Andean
region, was established as the dual flag of
Bolivia in 2009. Here, it flies over a view of
Lake Titicaca taken from the vantage of an
Aymara community in northern Bolivia
(Photo taken by the author).

Andean cosmology differs from
those held by other historic indigenous
groups in the Americas. While smallscale sustainability remains a consistent
theme throughout indigenous cultures,
Andean organizational structures and
spiritual beliefs are markedly different
than their indigenous counterparts.
Anthropologist R. Tom Zuidema writes
that Andean beliefs have not historically
centered around the notion of the
Heavens or the Underworld as did the
Aztecs and the Mayas. Rather, “Andean
people preferred to work out their

22
cosmologies pragmatically through their
political organizations,” using the two
primary tools of kinship and astronomy
to guide their social organization
(Zuidema
1992,
17).
Prior
to
colonization,
incredibly
complex
calendars
developed
through
astronomical observation determined
annual festivities, while ayllu kinship
networks facilitated the flow of goods
and services throughout society. The
ayllu organizational system allowed for
the expression of Andean values of
equitable distribution and respect for
Pachamama in daily life (Saavedra Pers.
Comm. 2018). CONAMAQ, one of the
foremost indigenous rights groups in
Bolivia, identifies the strengthening of
the ayllu system as one of their primary
objectives, as the system has been in
some ways responsible for the
preservation of Aymara and Quechua
culture
throughout
centuries
of
exploitative colonization (See Chapter
2). The other primary aim of the
organization is to advance women’s
rights in society, as patriarchal systems
were
imposed
upon
Andean

communities by colonizers and do not
reflect
indigenous
beliefs
of
complementarity between people and
genders (Cuevas 2018).
Ultimately, Andean indigenous
groups have long expressed their beliefs
of equitable distribution and respect for
“Pachamama” (Mother Earth) through
daily practices that revolve around
communal access and sustainability.
Aymara Shaman Calixto Quispe
articulated to me the way in which the
coca leaf connects indigenous people to
the earth and to their ancestors,
lamenting the fact that coca production
in Bolivia has been reduced by US drug
enforcement policies despite nearly all
of the cocaine produced from the coca
leaf being consumed in the US (Quispe
Pers. Comm. 2017). He indicated that
such difficulties are indicative of a larger
system of indigenous marginalization
that has featured diametrically opposed
worldviews
pitting
free
market
capitalism and globalization against
small-scale communal practices. In
today’s day any age, it is evident that
capitalist systems continue to win out.

Figure 2: A view of Lake Titicaca through ancient Andean ruins (Photo by the author).
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Evo’s Ascension
The 1980s are commonly referred to as the “lost decade” in Latin America due to
the complete state of disarray in which the majority of South American governments
found themselves (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 54). Interestingly, this very same decade is
referred to by the same derisive title amongst scholars of African development, indicating
that the economic crises faced by formerly colonized, developing countries were not
rooted in domestic mismanagement, but rather in a poorly designed process of
international development. A global market crisis left Latin American countries reeling,
with inflation rates shooting skyward and a rash of countries defaulting on massive debts.
In Bolivia, inflation reached an astonishing 11,805 percent in 1985, and it was evident
that changes needed to be made quickly (Hellinger 2015, 172). The international solution,
orchestrated by the United States, was to implement neoliberal reforms aligned with the
Washington Consensus, a series of policy recommendations created by World Bank
economist John Williamson. The Washington Consensus describes trends towards market
liberalization in international development policy, and according to contributor to the
Journal of Economic Growth William Easterly, was responsible for failures in poverty
reduction and economic revitalization throughout the late 1980s and 1990s (Easterly
2001; Kohl and Farthing 2006, 20-21). The Washington Consensus is constituted of ten
policy prescriptions that were meant to guide developing countries to economic stability
through liberal market mechanisms, identified by Williamson as follows:
1. fiscal discipline with deficits of less than two percent
2. a change in public expenditure priorities that reduces subsidies for special
interests
3. tax reform that includes cutting marginal tax rates, especially on overseas
investments
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4. financial liberalization, with market-determined interest rates, or,
minimally, the abolition of subsidized interest rates for special interests
5. unified exchange rates
6. trade liberalization and the replacement of trade restrictions by tariffs, not
to exceed 10 percent, or at worst 20 percent
7. increase of foreign direct investment through abolishing investment
barriers in order to ‘level the playing field’
8. privatization of state enterprises
9. deregulation and abolition of regulatory barriers to entry to all industries
10. guarantees of secure property rights (Williamson 1993).
The IMF and the World Bank were able to implement such prescriptions through
SAPs- conditional loans that pushed Bolivia and other developing countries to adopt
neoliberal policies, cutting social programs and increasing resource extraction and
exportation while doing so (York 2005, 188). Author John Kofas elaborates upon the
foreign policy practices of the IMF and the World Bank in his article entitled “The
Politics of Austerity: The IMF and US Foreign Policy in Bolivia” (Kofas 1995). Through
an analysis of unreleased IMF documents, Kofas discovered that “there was no doubt on
the part of the stabilization planners that their policy would augment the economic
interests of certain domestic and foreign groups and impose a lower standard of living on
the rest of society” (1995, 213-214). He finds that the IMF and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (one of five facets of the World Bank) were
used as foreign policy tools of the United States, which applied “extraordinary economic
pressure to force a new policy orientation on the part of its southern neighbors” when
Latin American countries pursued initiatives that sought economic nationalism (Kofas
1995, 215). The study by Rainer Thiele entitled “The Social Impact of Structural
Adjustment in Bolivia” shows that the SAPs implemented by the IMF and the World
Bank did not in fact achieve economic stabilization or poverty reduction, but rather
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increased the rural-urban income gap and had negligible effects on urban poverty
reduction (Thiele 2003, 304).
Bolivia’s source of resistance to international control prior to the institution of
neoliberal policies in the 1980s originated primarily from unions in the mining industries.
The Federation of Bolivian Miners’ Union (FSTMB) orchestrated the battle to restore
democracy through the 1970s, leading the Bolivian Workers Central (COB) in their
efforts to implement progressive workers’ rights under a military dictatorship (Kohl and
Farthing 2014, 8). By 1985, the World Bank and IMF had begun implementing their
structural adjustment procedures to initiate a “New Economic Policy” focusing on the
liberalization of Bolivia’s industries (Olivera 2004, 7). A key component of these efforts
was the move to close and privatize tin mines across the country that had been losing
profit, resulting in the firing of thousands of miners. This action, as Postero argues,
served to silence “the most combative section of civil society,” paving the way for further
implementation of neoliberal economic policy (Postero 2017, 29). In 1985, under
President Victor Paz Estenssoro, the “New Economic Policy” was launched, beginning
with Presidential Decree 21060. The Decree sought to diminish the state’s role in the
economy, introducing neoliberal language that “had the explicit intention of regaining the
support that the IMF, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and
United States withdrew during the UDP [Democratic and Popular Union] government
(1982-85)” (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 65-66). Overseeing the first round of neoliberal
reforms, then Bolivian economic planning minister Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, known
widely in Bolivia as “Goni,” encouraged international investment in Bolivian oil,
partially privatizing the industry and cutting royalties and taxes on the new oil fields from
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50 percent to 18 percent. When Goni assumed the presidency in 1993, his extractionoriented policies became a foundation of the administration’s economic revitalization
efforts. His goals were described by an “Energy Triangle,” a three-step process that
involved privatizing the oil sector, de-regulating hydrocarbon extraction, and creating the
country’s first “major pipeline” that would deliver oil to Brazil (Hindery and Hecht 2013,
27). The last objective allowed for the entrance of Enron, a massive American energy
corporation. Enron would not be the last major US corporation to enter Bolivia during the
neoliberal era, but it was one of many foreign prospectors that would ultimately lead to
the termination of neoliberal administrations.
Benjamin Kohl argues that “Bolivia has served as an important testing ground for
international development economists who point to the country as a textbook case of
economic liberalization” (Kohl 2002). However, the neoliberal policies implemented in
Bolivia did not achieve their proclaimed effects. Poverty was not reduced, the prices of
basic utilities increased, and strikes erupted throughout the country despite neoliberal
attempts at fracturing unions and repressing civil society. The Bolivian government lost
255 million dollars in 1997 alone due to privatization, and during that same year, the
price of gas increased by 25 percent nationwide (Kohl 2002, 460). Privatization of oil
companies caused further government shortages despite consistent increases in extraction
rates, and job cuts in the transportation oil industries led many Bolivians to search for
part-time manual labor or emigrate to Argentina in search of better opportunities (Kohl
2002, 459). Between 1995 and 1997, domestic water and electricity prices rose by 50
percent, which lead to more outcries amongst the populous (Kohl 2002, 460).
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Even as SAPs failed to bring about poverty reduction and increased the prices of
basic goods and services, the World Bank and IMF continued to push measures to
privatize Bolivian industries. In 1997, the cities of El Alto and La Paz were targeted for
water privatization by an external corporation, Aguas del Illimani, a company in which
the World Bank held 8 percent of shares (York 2005, 188). Two years later, the Bolivian
government passed Law 2029 under World Bank recommendation. The law was designed
to privatize water and sanitation across the country, and its constituent clauses drastically
reconfigured water rights in Bolivia, particularly for indigenous people. Communal water
holdings became illegal, rainwater collection was prohibited, and local townships were
barred from collecting water taxes or determining where wells would be built (Olivera
2004, 8-9). Instead, only contracted companies could distribute water, which
fundamentally disrupted water-use practices that had been in place since the Incas
inhabited the Andes. In Cochabamba, Bolivia’s third largest city, only half of the
population was connected to the water system in 1999, with most other individuals and
families reliant upon cooperative water houses that were made illegal by Law 2029.
Perhaps the most disruptive aspect of Law 2029 was the forty-year concession awarded
to the company Aguas del Tunari, a subsidiary of the US Bechtel Corporation, for control
of Cochabamba’s water and sanitation system. Almost immediately upon entry, Aguas
del Tunari doubled water prices in the city, initiating protests on a scale that had not been
seen in contemporary Bolivia. So powerful was the resistance, Bechtel was forced to
remove Aguas del Tunari from Bolivia, and proceeded to sue the Bolivian government
for lost profits in a suit that was later withdrawn due to public pressure (York 2005, 188).
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Indigenous activist efforts came to a head during these Cochabamba “water wars”
of 2000, at which point the country was “suddenly catapulted on to the world stage as an
inspiration for opponents of neoliberal globalization as it proved that popular resistance
to restructuring is possible” (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 14-15). Amidst the international
tensions, indigenous-led activist groups such as Coordinadora Defensa del Agua y la
Vida (the Coalition in Defense of Water and Life) and Qullasuyu Consejo Nacional de
Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (National Council of Ayllus and Markas- CONAMAQ)
rose to prominence (Fabricant 2013). These groups promoted an ideology rooted in
indigeneity that sought not to return Bolivia to a pre-industrial era, but rather to “use parts
of prehistory to re-establish the links between humans and nature that have been ruptured
by extractive industries” (Fabricant 2013, 170). The emergence of combative indigenous
groups during the water wars created a foundation for the resistance that would ultimately
overthrow successive neoliberal administrations and symbolically end Bolivia’s
neoliberal era.
Following the presidency of Goni, former military dictator Hugo Banzer won a
strongly contested election in 1997 with a mere 22.3 percent of the national vote (Kohl
and Farthing 2006, 150). His policies were largely an extension of Goni’s economic
initiatives, and his tenure was defined by social unrest and protest against water
privatization. Under political and personal health duress, Banzer stepped down in 2001,
leaving the seat open for contestation in 2002. In this election, Evo Morales came in as a
surprising second to former president Goni, giving hope to indigenous populations yet
maintaining a neoliberal leader. However, Goni grew rapidly unpopular due to his
compliance with the initiatives of global institutions. In 2003, the IMF demanded that
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Bolivia reduce its national deficit from 8.5 to 5.5 percent of GDP if it wished to continue
receiving debt relief, and in response, Goni leveraged a 12.5 percent flat income tax
which invariably led to protest (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 172). Shortly thereafter, Evo
Morales and senator-elect of the MAS Filemón Escóbar led the charge to reverse the gas
and oil privatization that had taken place over the previous years. Enraged by a 2003
government study that showed major corporations such as BP and Amoco enjoying the
world’s lowest exploration and operating costs in Bolivia, the indigenous and labor
organizations that were mobilized during the water wars took to the streets again to
demand the nationalization of Bolivia’s gas reserves. Goni’s response was militaristic,
and the ensuing deaths of three indigenous Bolivians at a road blockade outside of La Paz
due to a protest-related confrontation spurred an escalation of resistance, particularly
among the indigenous Aymara community from which the lives had been tragically lost.
By mid-October of 2003, over 70 people had been killed due to conflict, and Goni was
forced to flee the country (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 174-175).
The next two years saw interim presidents warding off continued protests until the
2005 election allowed Bolivians to democratically express their demands. In 2005, rising
star Evo Morales and his party won in a landslide victory, fulfilling the plethora of
objectives that had been built in opposition to a neoliberal agenda since the 1980s
(Postero 2017).

Evo Morales and Climate Justice
It was under these circumstances that Evo Morales assumed his role as president.
The previous 5 years had been defined by protest and defiance in the face of international
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interest, and Bolivians were looking forward to an era of prosperity driven by
nationalized industry and the injection of indigenous cosmologies into national policy. By
2004, Bolivia carried an international debt of over $4.3 billion, seventy percent of which
had been accumulated between 1985 and 1999 (Olivera 2004, 15). Unions had been
fractured, over sixty-seven percent of the population was living in poverty, and job
instability defined the working class with underemployment reaching fifty-three percent
of the economically active population (Webber 2011, 16, 23). Further, natural resources
were being removed from the country at a rapid rate, and Bolivia was not reaping
proportionate economic benefits. Through the 1990s, Bolivia received 18 percent of
revenue generated from gas, while international corporations gathered the remaining 82
percent (Hindery and Hecht 2013, 28). By the time Evo took office, 70.2 percent of
Bolivia’s debt was external, with 90 percent of that total owed to multilateral lending
institutions (Webber 2011, 33). Bolivians were seeking an alternative to the neoliberal
policies that had enabled foreign exploitation and failed to produce expected advances,
and they found that alternative in the form of the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement
for Socialism, MAS). Originally perceived as a “political instrument” of unions and their
allies, the MAS employed tactics that effectively encompassed both indigenous and labor
ideologies. Kohl and Farthing identify three primary ideological tendencies that drive the
MAS party: indiginest, Marxist, and popular nationalist- all of which were embodied in
the form of Evo Morales (Kohl and Farthing 2014, 14-15).
Evo rose to popularity as a cocalero- a coca leaf grower who took to organizing in
opposition to the United States’ efforts to eradicate the plant as a part of the war on drugs
initiative that took off in the 1970s (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 157). By 2002, Evo had

31
become one of only four cocalero or indigenous members of the 130-member Bolivian
congress, a difficult position for a man with revolutionary ambitions. A prominent leader
in the gas wars, Evo was deemed partially responsible for the violence that arose from the
indigenous uprisings, and was removed from Congress by 104 of his fellow members in
January of 2002 (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 171). Though this effort was orchestrated to
dissipate the increasing resistance facing the neoliberal administration, it had virtually the
opposite effect. In the following election, Evo and fellow indigenous leader Felipe
Quispe gained ground through the MAS in the Senate and Congress, with the party
winning 8 and 27 of the delegation’s seats, respectively (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 171).
By the time the 2005 elections came around, momentum was clearly behind Morales and
his party, and his overwhelming victory served as a major pronouncement for indigenous
people in the Global South.
It must be noted that Evo faced unprecedented expectations upon gaining the
presidency. His campaign platform was virtually based on revolutionary changes to the
entire pre-existing governmental structure, and his constituents were looking for an
answer to centuries of colonial oppression. As Kohl and Farthing aptly state, “even a
president of good-will cannot fix 20 years of neoliberal policies overlaid on 500 years of
social exclusion” (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 2). However, these were Evo’s envisaged
ambitions, and his first tasks were to follow through on the ongoing demands to
nationalize the gas industry and create a new national constitution that more accurately
reflected the indigenous tenets that guide the majority of Bolivian residents. Evo made
good on these demands, though not without resistance from non-indigenous factions of
Congress. Though the new constitution was one of Evo’s first initiatives, it wasn’t until
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2009 that the finalized version managed to pass into law (Postero 2017, 10). Along with
establishing a series of rights for “indigenous originary and peasant peoples,” the new
constitution expressly endorsed the “buen vivir” ideology that encompasses a broad range
of indigenous virtues relating to equality and, perhaps most importantly in regards to
climate change, respect for “Pachamama,” or Mother Earth (Constitutional Assembly
2009). It is here that Evo’s ideologies parallel those that define climate justice, a
movement toward equality in the face of climate crises that appeared on the global scene
in 1999 (Widdick 2018).
It is no coincidence that Bolivia has been subject to international interest
regarding natural resource extraction. Kohl and Farthing cite that Bolivia is home to the
second largest natural gas reserve in South America, one of the world’s leading iron ore
mines, two of the largest silver mines on earth, and half of the known deposits of lithium
globally (Kohl and Farthing 2014, 5). These circumstances leave Bolivia vulnerable to
fall victim to the “resource curse,” a term coined by economist Richard Auty (1994) to
describe the plight of resource-wealthy countries that suffer from unequal trade
relationships derived from colonial power dynamics. Given these circumstances,
combined with elevated rates of poverty and centuries of marginalization fueled by
racism, Evo’s rise to power provided a conduit for the expression of a dire need to
achieve equality relative to the rest of the developed world. This need was being echoed
elsewhere through the rhetoric of climate justice- a movement to address the
disproportionate impacts of climate change on disenfranchised populations.
Climate justice is a term that was coined by the NGO CorpWatch in a 1999 report
entitled “Greenhouse Gangsters vs Climate Justice” (Widdick 2018). The concept rapidly
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gained traction amongst international climate and human rights groups, and was
eventually developed into a doctrine through the 2002 international declaration “Bali
Principles of Climate Justice,” which used language from the 1991 “Environmental
Justice Principles” created by the People of Color Environmental Justice Leadership
Summit to outline the components of climate justice (Bali Earth Summit 2002). The Bali
Principles are remarkably similar to aspects of both the 2009 Bolivian Constitution and
the 2010 World People’s Agreement, which indicates a trend toward justice in global
climate discussions.
The 6th of the 27 enumerated Bali Principles states “Climate Justice opposes the
role of transnational corporations in shaping unsustainable production and consumption
patterns and lifestyles, as well as their role in unduly influencing national and
international decision-making” (Bali Earth Summit 2002). That the 2002 document
identifies transnational corporations as a key inhibitor to the goals of climate justice
speaks volumes to the presence climate justice has in Evo’s rhetoric. Other principles call
for a moratorium on new resource extraction projects and demand that transnational
corporations and their facilitators be held responsible for the “climate debt” they have
accrued through years of reckless emissions and environmentally degrading practices
(Bali Earth Summit 2002). These demands are reminiscent of Evo’s calls for “restorative
justice” and an “International Climate and Environmental Justice Tribunal” that are
articulated in the World People’s Agreement (World People’s Conference on Climate
Change and the Rights of Mother Earth 2010). In fact, the word “justice” appears 22
times in the Evo-initiated document, emphasizing the commitment of the Morales
government to righting the historical wrongs perpetrated against the Bolivian people.
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Author Patrick Bond described the World People’s Conference as the most “portentous”
event that has yet contributed to the lineage of the movement, and contends that the
Conference served as a “confirmation of a climate justice identity,” accentuating the
prominence of indigenous-inspired Bolivian messaging within the climate justice
movement (Bond 2012, 187).
True to his campaign messaging, Evo was able to effectively nationalize the oil
industry in Bolivia, fully reversing the percentage of value retained by the Bolivian state
in its oil industry from 18 percent to 82 percent (Hindery and Hecht 2013, 28). For the
first time, Bolivia ran a surplus, which reached 5 percent of GDP in 2008 and has
initiated sustained GDP growth (Postero 2017, 98). Under the Morales administration,
Bolivia has enacted social redistribution the likes of which had not been seen in the
contemporary state. From 2004-2014, the Bolivian economy grew at an average rate of
4.9 percent, and the percentage of Bolivians living in poverty was reduced by a full 30
percent (World Bank: Overview 2018). Per capita income rose from $1,010 in 2005 to
$2,922 in 2013, and extreme poverty rates dropped from 38 percent to 18.8 percent in
that same period (Postero 2017, 99). Though Evo’s “reconstituted neoliberalism” fell
short of a full economic overhaul, there is an argument to be made for Evo’s commitment
to climate justice through progressive extractivism (See Chapter 3). Bolivia has not been
weaned off resource extraction, but it has made major steps toward ensuring that its
population is less vulnerable to impending climate changes. Literacy rates have improved
under Evo’s leadership, schools have been established in underserved populations,
hospitals have been built with excesses earned through export revenue, and Bolivian
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people have maintained their support for Evo, propelling him to a presidential term that
may last until 2025 (Saavedra Pers. Comm. 2018).
Ismael Saavedra, Director of the School of International Studies (SIT) in Bolivia,
asserted in a personal interview in 2018 that while Evo’s continued dependence on
extractive industries is clearly contradictory, his popularity has been maintained due to
the social equality measures that have been effectively implemented in the past years
(Saavedra Pers. Comm. 2018). Even in the face of controversy such as the TIPNIS
development project, Evo has been able to balance indigenous values with neoliberal
practices, and has been rewarded with successive elections. However, the sustainability
of such an approach remains in question. Bolivia’s rebellious population has been
placated by social redistribution, yet further structural changes must be made if the
ultimate goals of the World People’s Agreement are to be met. Evo has made strides
toward climate justice, but his government remains virtually handcuffed by a history of
extractivism that has proven to be inextricably tied to Bolivia’s economic success. More
worrisome still, the practices of international organizations such as the World Bank and
the IMF have not proven to be conducive to the goals of climate justice. Even as the
failures of SAPs in Bolivia became overwhelmingly evident, the rhetoric of the entities
employing those strategies has not been satisfactorily reconfigured. Peet argues that new
attempts at structural intervention by the IMF and the World Bank “have simply
repackaged the structural adjustment policies of the past into the new poverty reduction
programs,” thereby maintaining a neoliberal hegemony that continues to disadvantage
developing countries (2009, 100).
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Climate Vulnerability
Climate vulnerability is an important concept to understand moving forward.
Vulnerability is created through myriad avenues, and is generally context specific. In the
case of Bolivia, climate vulnerability can be best understood through a synthesis of
impending climate changes and historic oppressions that come together to create
hierarchies of vulnerability delineated by respective abilities to insulate from damaging
climate changes. Those with lower vulnerabilities are those that have the means to evade
threatening climatic factors, while those with higher vulnerability are less able to
extricate themselves from precarious climate situations. In their 2004 book entitled “At
Risk,” authors Ben Wisner, Piers Blaike, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis argue that
vulnerability is not a matter of arbitrary environmental circumstance, but rather a direct
product of “social, political and economic environments” that accentuate risk factors
(Wisner et al 2004, 4). Thus, natural disasters emanating from anthropogenic climate
change are not in fact “natural,” but are rather reflective of pre-existing vulnerability.
Natural hazards exist, but their ability to exert societal damage is dependent on the
resilience of any given community.
Author Junot Diaz uses the 2010 earthquake in Haiti to exemplify this point. Diaz
refers to the massive earthquake as true “apocalypse” from the perspective of the Haitian
citizenry. He then presents an etymological argument drawing from the Greek word
“apocalypsis, meaning to uncover or unveil,” using this foundation to assert that
‘“[disasters] expose the underlying power structures, the injustices, the patterns of
corruption and the unacknowledged inequalities”’ present in any given society (Diaz
2011, 1). Disasters thus expose facets of society that are otherwise masked by the veil of
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normality, showing in stark terms the extent to which communities can adapt to and
recover from natural hazards. In the case of Haiti, 250,000 people were killed and 1
million left homeless from the 1 minute long quake (Diaz 2011, 1). Though an
earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale would be devastating anywhere, Haiti was
particularly ravaged due to the country’s historic impoverishment and lack of
infrastructure. In 2009, Haiti’s per capita annual income was 1,045 USD, ranking 179th
of 192 nations (IMF 2018). Systemic economic suppression combined with natural
hazards make for a vulnerable society with little adaptive capacity. In the face of
continually accelerating climate changes, those countries that do not have the resources to
defend against natural hazards will inevitably face disproportionate climate effects.
Bolivia is deemed highly vulnerable to climate change for a number of factors. A
history of oppression, particularly amongst the indigenous people that constitute 62
percent of the country’s population, has led to unfavorable conditions for millions of
Bolivians. An overview of poverty statistics prior to Evo’s election lends insights into the
conditions faced by Bolivians following neoliberal reform and points to the inequality
derived from centuries of discriminatory practices. Björn-Sören Gigler’s 2009 study
through the Georgetown University Center for Latin American Studies provides crucial
data relating to indigenous inequality in the early 21st century. The study includes only
data collected prior to 2005, which will lay a foundation upon which to assess Evo’s
reforms. Before Morales assumed the presidency in 2005, 60 percent of the total
population lived below the poverty line and 38 percent were determined to be extremely
impoverished (Postero 2017, 99). Statistics show that poverty in Bolivia is categorically
associated with race, with 73.5 percent of indigenous Bolivians living below the poverty
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line in 2002 as opposed to less than 50 percent of non-indigenous people (Gigler 2009, 78). A geographical analysis of population centers situates such statistics within a more
holistic context. In 2002, 78 percent of rural Bolivia was constituted of indigenous
communities, while 66 percent of cities were composed of mestizo and criollo residents
(Gigler 2009, 6). Unsurprisingly, the poverty discrepancy was even more substantial in
rural areas, where 83 percent of communities were impoverished and 67 percent of
residents lived in extreme poverty, contrasted to respective rates of 54 and 26 percent in
urban areas (Gigler 2009, 8). The following figure shows the distinct correlation between
indigenous populations and poverty, and also lends insight into the distribution of
indigenous peoples throughout Bolivia.

Figure 3: Bolivia according to indigenous population density (left) and rates of poverty (right)
(Gigler, 6,9).

As can be seen in Figure 3, the areas with the highest rates of extreme poverty are
strongly correlated with the highest proportion of indigenous residency. The highlands,
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where 42 percent of Bolivia’s population lives, has a poverty incidence of 70 percent,
followed by the valleys with an incidence of 69 percent, and finally by the plains with an
incidence of 54 percent (Gigler 2009, 9). True to theme, the two departments with the
highest rates of poverty, Potosi and Chuquisaca, also happen to be those with the highest
percentage of indigenous residency (66 and 74 percent respectively), while those with the
lowest rates of poverty, Santa Cruz and Tarija, have the lowest percentage of indigenous
residency (32 and 16 percent respectively) (Gigler 2009, 9).
Perhaps as concerning as general poverty trends is the economic inequality that
existed prior to Evo’s presidency. Bolivia entered the 21st century with one of the highest
rates of economic inequality in the world, with the bottom 20 percent of households
holding a share of only 4 percent of the nation’s income and the top 20 percent of the
population holding a share of 62 percent of national income (Gigler 2009, 12). Yet again,
race is heavily implicated in these statistics. As two-thirds of indigenous people fall
within the lowest 50 percent of national earners, economic inequality exerts a
disproportionate impact on indigenous people (Gigler 2009, 12-13). A 2000 study by
Chiswick et al confirms this trend, finding that monolingual Spanish speakers in Bolivia
earn 25 percent more than those who speak indigenous languages (Chiswick et al 2000).
These statistics clearly show that while Bolivia is economically vulnerable in many
aspects, indigenous Bolivians face the most vulnerability due to historical
marginalization.
Climate vulnerability is exacerbated by climatic conditions that are highly
susceptible to drastic changes given slight climate disruptions. In the coming chapter, we
will see that Bolivia is situated in a precarious setting due to the nature of the country’s
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geography. A series of fragile habitats comprises a climate system within which over
one-third of the labor force works in agriculture (Seiler et al 2012). The 2014 IPCC report
entitled “Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability” notes that highland subsistence farming
on the altiplano, where a majority of small-scale farmers are Aymara, will face some of
the most disruptive climate pressures of any food production system in Central and South
America due to increasing rates of desertification and water loss due to glacial melting
(IPCC 2014, 32). This is especially concerning given high endemic poverty rates among
indigenous groups in the altiplano, most of whom rely on subsistence farming for
survival. Forty seven percent of Bolivia’s total agricultural GDP comes from small-scale
farmers on the altiplano and surrounding valleys, while industrialized farming in the
lowlands accounts for the remaining fifty three percent (Alcala 2010, 4). Agriculture is
not the only industry that will be impacted, but it is one that provides crucial life support
to rural communities that are highly indigenous.
The Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (NDGAI) created a climate change
vulnerability index ranking all countries on earth in accordance with relative levels of
vulnerability to climate change. Each country receives an ND-GAIN score, which is
reflective of the quality of 6 life-supporting sectors: food, water, health, ecosystem
service, human habitat, and infrastructure. The highest ranking as of 2017 came in at 76.1
(Norway), while the lowest ranking came in at 20.3 (Somalia) (NDGAI 2019). The study
also divided countries into categories according to relative wealth, assigning each nation
to either “low,” “lower middle,” “upper middle,” or “upper.” The correlation between
wealth and vulnerability is stunning. The 27 least vulnerable nations are all classified as
“upper” in terms of wealth, and the first “lower middle” classification does not come
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until number 40. No “low” country cracks the top 82 least vulnerable nations, and none
of the 28 most vulnerable countries exceed a “lower middle” classification (NDGAI
2019). These findings present strong evidence for the argument that vulnerability is not
based solely on climatic factors, but is rather closely aligned with global economic
inequality. Bolivia finds itself ranked 127th least vulnerable out of 181 countries with an
ND-GAIN score of 40.3, while the United States comes in at 15th with less than 10
points removing it from first place (NDGAI 2019). These rankings show the extent to
which income disparity plays a role in elevating vulnerability, with the wealthiest nations
tending to find avenues by which to protect themselves from climate variation as the
poorest nations struggle find resilience. Wisner et al note that vulnerability is
compounded by exposure to environmental risk, but make the important distinction that
disasters “are a complex mixture of natural hazards and human action” that link
vulnerability to “broader patterns in society” (2004, 5). Disasters can be a major
impediment to development and often are compounded by repeated shocks that would not
generally affect more insulated societies. Ultimately, vulnerability is constructed through
human mechanisms that elevate risks for people with less access to resources.
In the coming chapters, we will see the ways in which the Morales administration
has addressed systemic inequality stemming from racial prejudice. His efforts at poverty
reduction and the alleviation of income inequality have advanced indigenous equality in
Bolivia, and in doing so, have curtailed vulnerabilities associated with social disparities. I
will also work to explicate the relationship between the United States and Bolivia by
exploring the ways in which vulnerability affects climate solution strategies, showing that
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economically insulated nations do not have the same incentive to seek climate change
resolution.
As climate change escalates, it becomes more and more evident that the impacts
are disproportionately affecting those that have the least financial and social mobility,
and that global inequality serves only to exacerbate climate effects. Subaltern voices have
become more prominent on a global stage, and in Bolivia, a beacon of indigenous
resistance, these voices are demanding climate justice. What remains to be seen is the
extent to which international structures can serve to amplify climate justice initiatives, or
the extent to which those systems continue to impede upward mobilization and resultant
climate resilience. This requires an overview of the international sphere and the countries
and institutions that most influence climate discussions. Have multilateral lending
institutions learned from their past mistakes in development, or are similar approaches
being taken despite a rocky history? How has Evo sought to reduce vulnerability in
Bolivia? What role does Bolivia play in advancing climate justice? What barriers does
Bolivia continue to face in its climate related endeavors? Through a thorough analysis of
the current practices of international organizations, combined with a critical review of
Bolivia’s climate-oriented initiatives, answers to these questions can be fashioned.
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Chapter 2
Bolivian Colonial History and Climate Developments
Bolivia is a region imbued with indigenous history that extends far before the
establishment of the contemporary nation state. That history is reflected in many aspects
of Bolivian life today, and has been integral in shaping the sociopolitical dynamics at
hand. Thus, it is important to interrogate the developments that have led to the current
political context in Bolivia, with a particular focus on the colonial interactions that have
shaped the country’s political and economic systems. Bolivia’s history is long and
convoluted, and as such, a complete chronology will not be necessary to establish an
adequate base from which to analyze current contexts. Rather, this chapter will identify
key features and themes of Bolivian history that have influenced the contemporary state
and its recent efforts toward climate justice. Additionally, I address climate change and
the dangers it portends, with attention directed to the nuances of Bolivia’s climate
systems and the climate risks faced by Bolivian people. By establishing historical and
climatic contexts for Bolivia, a better understanding of the contemporary Bolivian
government and its climate justice platform can be fostered.

Pre-Colonial History
Bolivia presents a peculiar geographical context that would not logically seem to
be conducive to human settlement. Two-thirds of the country’s land area is occupied by
dense tropical rainforest that until recently has been largely inaccessible to humans due to
its remote placement and lack of accessible land. The other one-third of the country is
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taken up by the Andes Mountains, one of the most inhospitable mountain ranges on earth
due to elevational factors.

Figure 4: A map of Bolivia according to climatic conditions (University of Texas Libraries 2019).

At first glance, Bolivia presents a major logistical challenge to the development of
enduring human society, and yet people have resided in the region for millenia. In fact,
Bolivia’s prehistoric societies lay claim to some of the most revolutionary cultural and
technological developments that had been seen up to that point in history. This baffling
paradox is demystified by the presence of the Bolivian highlands, know by Spanishspeakers as the altiplano. The massive elliptical plain is situated between the Occidental
and Cordillera branches of the Andes range, extending 500 miles southward from Lake
Titicaca in northern Bolivia with an average elevation of 13,000 feet. Of the 50,000
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square miles that constitute the altiplano, two-thirds resides within the borders of
contemporary Bolivia (Klein 2011, 6). Human history in the region nucleated around the
altiplano and its associated valley system. Here, the domestication of the staple products
of Andean civilization took place, from potatoes and other root vegetables to quinoa to
cameloid livestock. Though the land was arable, the elevation presented further
challenges. Diurnal temperature changes of up to 100° Fahrenheit posed a significant
barrier to humans and crops alike, but like all other adversarial elements in the region,
this was overcome through stunning innovation that has allowed for the extensive lineage
of indigenous culture in Bolivia (Forsberg Pers. Comm. 2018).
Around 800 B.C., the Chavin population brought unprecedented changes to the
Andean region, establishing for the first time a common culture throughout the altiplano.
During this time, the production of textiles, pottery, and rare metals proliferated, marking
the start to an era of rapid urbanization and cultural advancement. It was during this
period that the mineral wealth of the region was truly discovered, a feature that would
ultimately lead to intensive colonial exploitation in years to come. By 100 A.D., the
Chavin had disappeared, replaced by several disaggregated societies with distinct cultural
practices (Klein 2011, 11). The more successful societies were located around Lake
Titicaca, and used the massive water source strategically. The Tiwanaku were one such
society, and their innovative capacity allowed them to spread across the altiplano,
developing one of the most technologically advanced prehistoric societies in the world.
They created monuments with stone blocks larger than the most recent Apollo spaceship,
developed calendars and accurate astronomy models, identified cardinal directions and
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built their structures in alignment with them, and devised agricultural systems that
utilized the thermal capacity of water to protect their crops against nightly frosts.

Figure 5: A Tiwanaku calendar sculpture located at the Tiwanaku ruins just south of Lake
Titicaca on the altiplano (Photo taken by the author).

Archeological studies of the Tiwanaku society serve both to illuminate the ways in which
the altiplano has been utilized and to provide a case study for the progression of society
in prehistoric Bolivia. Perhaps even more useful in terms of contemporary influence is
the study of the Tiwanaku’s decline. After a full millenium of productivity evidenced by
effective agricultural techniques and impressive architecture, the Tiwanaku fell victim to
climate change. A climate-induced interruption in the El Niño-La Niña cycle (see page
56) caused a century-long drought that effectively wiped out the entire population and
reduced the water level in Lake Titicaca by several meters, as shown by late-Tiwanaku
structures that were found below the water (Kolata 1993, 287). The shift in architecture
from open, aesthetic structures to fortified utilitarian castles closer to the lake align with
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Christian Parenti’s theory of counterinsurgency presented in his acclaimed book Tropic
of Chaos: Climate Change and the New Geography of Violence. In this work, Parenti
acknowledges the potential of a new “Dark Ages” in which climate change drives
violence induced by a scarcity of resources and volatile climatic conditions (Parenti 2011,
15). He predicts that those with pre-existing power and resources will move toward
defensive tactics, which will then leave the disenfranchised to fight amongst themselves
for what is left. The collapse of the Tiwanaku does not necessarily prove theories of
counterinsurgency to be universally correct, but it does provide a tragic example of the
effect climate disruption can have on an established agriculture-based civilization in the
Andes mountains.
After the decline of the Tiwanaku around 1200 A.D., Aymara kingdoms arose
across the altiplano. From the end of the 12th century until Spanish conquest in the 16th
century, the Aymara dominated the highlands. Again, the most powerful states were
centered around Lake Titicaca, and through aggressive tactics that mirror the final stages
of Tiwanaku development, the Aymara asserted themselves as the premier civilization in
the region. Their buildings were fortified and defensive, and they introduced more
intensive cameloid herding practices as well as agricultural techniques still utilized today
that incorporate verticality to ensure that respective crops grow most effectively in
appropriate climates (see Figure 7). With the Aymara also came the first written history
of Bolivia, which has allowed scholars to more accurately determine the practices and
cultures that preceded Spanish invasion (Klein 2011, 15). The continuity of this oral and
written history also supports the understanding of current indigenous practices, as the
Aymara identity still constitutes a large portion of Bolivia’s indigenous people. The
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Aymara are also responsible for the conception of the ayllu- a familial social organization
system with communal landholdings from which communal indigenous practices in
Bolivia today are in part derived. The ayllu system aided in the creation of the “vertical
integration of microecological systems” which was “based on the production of different
crops and bound into a nonmarket economy through elaborate systems of kinship,
exchange, and labor obligations” and “was fundamental in maintaining a powerful and
economically vital society on the altiplano” (Klein 2011, 15). Vertically integrated
agriculture and communal resource holdings continue to be integral facets of indigenous
life in rural Bolivia, which is a testament to the efficacy of the practices and their
endurance through centuries of colonialism.
During the 15th century, the Aymara kingdoms faced pressure from expansionist
Quechua-speaking groups north of Lake Titicaca near Cuzco. By 1470, Aymara societies
had lost much of their autonomy due to ineffective organization techniques derived from
a history of inter-societal tensions on the altiplano. The Quechua-Cuzco groups, who
became known as the Inca, quickly established themselves on the altiplano and subjected
the Aymara groups to taxation. However, despite Inca occupation, the Aymara
maintained their societal fabric, retaining cultural leaders and utilizing their consistent
surpluses to pay tribute to the Incas. Aymara revolts against the Inca occurred throughout
the end of the 15th century, but the Inca were ultimately successful in dominating the
entirety of the altiplano, which became known as Kollasuyo- one of the four provinces
the Inca inhabited (Klein 2011, 20). By the early 16th century, the Inca had established a
series of roads, warehouses, and urban centers across the altiplano, and were well into the
process of creating one of the most powerful non-European political entities in the world.
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The conception of the ayllu was not lost within the Inca structure; in fact, a “mosaic of
political structures, religions, and languages” existed within the Inca empire, which
points to a structural system that was less domineering than it was inclusive (Klein 2011,
19). Further evidence to this point comes with the non-market mechanism by which
goods and services were distributed. Klein notes that even the Spanish recognized a
social and economic equality that emerged from such a process, with adequate
compensation and rest given to workers despite the compulsory nature of the work.
Ayllus, or kinship networks, established interfamilial access to multiple ecological zones,
which in turn bolstered the durability of the Incas’ agricultural system. The ayllu is a
spiritual, economic, and labor system that “shares work obligations and redistributes a
surplus among its constituent families according to an ideology of reciprocity” (Boelens
et al 1998, 211). Such a structure was a key reason for the efficiency of the Incan social
organization, and also played a major role in maintaining cultural norms, values, and
practices throughout ensuing centuries of rapacious colonialism. By the time of the
arrival of the Spanish in the mid-16th century, the Inca had 3 million people operating
under their command, nearly half of the population of Spain at the time (Klein 2011, 22).
With a massive organizational structure that rested primarily on the backs of taxable
peasantry sitting atop vast mineral and land resources, the Spanish quickly realized that
the altiplano was ripe for exploitation.

Colonial History
In the 16th century, Spain was one of the most powerful nations in the world. Its
extensive control over much of the Americas combined with a strong Mediterranean trade
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relationship facilitated by an expansive naval force placed Spain in an unparalleled
position in terms of colonial potential. The altiplano and the complexly organized people
that lived upon it became a primary target for resource exportation, as the structures
established by the Inca could be repurposed to constitute a resource extraction machine
that disproportionately benefited the Spanish overseas. Thus, the Spanish first engaged in
an increased “Quechuanization” of the region, hoping to take advantage of the Inca’s
power in order to extort labor and taxation from the Inca constituency (Klein 2011, 18).
Initially effective, Klein notes that while the Inca were known for their “administrative
and organizational ability, so the genius of the Spaniards would ultimately reside in their
ability to integrate the powerful European drive of private enterprise into the context of
formal government structures” (Klein 2011, 25). However, as interactions with the
Spanish continued, the relationship became untenable for indigenous Bolivians. The
imposition of extractive systems left indigenous people with few choices: either supply
goods to the Spanish market, sell labor for wages, or starve (Klein, 37). To make matters
worse, European diseases began to decimate indigenous populations, further relegating
indigenous people to lower rungs in the new colonial structure.
Increased extraction and the hardening of Spanish rule fomented anti-colonial
sentiments that drove the formation of resistant groups throughout the Andean region.
Much of this was attributable to the policies of Peruvian Viceroy Francisco Toledo who,
from 1572-1576, was charged with standardizing a system of governance across Bolivia,
then known as Upper Peru. Toledo increased mining productivity and entrenched
Western development ideals in the organizational structure of Bolivia by explicitly
orienting the focus of the Spanish to an export economy. In doing so, Toledo further
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reduced the agency of Andean indigenous groups, utilizing them purely for their labor
efficacy and knowledge of regional mineral deposits. In the period following Toledo,
indigenous rebellions erupted throughout the region, most of them organized through
ayllu structures that had persisted despite Spanish rule (Klein 2011, 37). With these
rebellions began the legacy of indigenous resistance that has persisted to the present day.
Through the 1600s rare mineral mines were established throughout the Andean
region that focused the labor of the indigenous population into specific economic centers,
the two largest being in Potosi and Oruro. Spanish populations continued to grow
throughout the 17th century, and the eastern lowland frontier was developed and
expanded, encroaching on the territory of several disparate indigenous groups located
within the rainforest. As metropolitan centers were established, the indigenous population
was increasingly pauperized and forced into unsafe, unjust working conditions. A
depression in the silver economy lasting from the late 17th century to the early 18th
caused some internal conflict among Spaniards and led to a contraction in population of
urban centers that had been established near major mining developments. As has
generally been the case, indigenous populations experienced growth and decline
inversely proportional to Spanish population trends. The corresponding growth of
indigenous populations during the silver depression allowed for stronger forms of
resistance, which manifested in indigenous rebellions that attempted to take advantage of
the “civil wars” between Spaniards that were proliferating throughout the region (Klein
2011, 58). The resulting indigenous consolidation reinforced ayllu structures and allowed
for the maintenance of traditional practices through the century-long silver depression.
Indigenous coca production began to accelerate in the mountainous regions surrounding
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La Paz, and indigenous people utilized resulting surpluses to trade with counterparts in
the lowlands. Though full economic agency was never restored to indigenous groups, it is
noteworthy that continued resistance to foreign rule and deeply entrenched practices and
ayllu structures allowed for the persistence of indigenous cultures despite intensive
colonization for many centuries.
Spain resolved economic difficulties in the late 18th century by granting the
emerging metropolis of Buenos Aires control over resources extracted from Potosi. A
more regional control allowed for renewed subjugation of indigenous laborers, yet
simultaneously distanced Spain from its colonies. Rebellions at this time were common,
though most were localized and oriented toward alleviation of regional taxes or unjust
working conditions. It wasn’t until the Tupac Amaru rebellion from 1780-1782 that a
legitimate independence movement was started. The rebellion was multi-class and broadreaching, and initiated a series of revolts that ultimately led to the founding of the
Bolivian Republic in 1825 by renowned Venezuelan military leader Simon Bolivar
(Klein 2011, 74).
Though Bolivia was now free from Spanish control, the country was by no means
situated to achieve economic or social independence. The resource wealth that had been
discovered in Bolivia compounded by the colonial extraction mechanisms that had been
in place for hundreds of years invited continued exploitation from foreign entrepreneurs.
Extractive relationships forged in the early colonial era have left residual trade practices
that continue to disadvantage Bolivia in favor of investors abroad, a testament to the
successive evolution of colonialism that persist through many centuries.
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Post-Colonial History
Bolivia’s independence from Spain did not equate to liberation for its indigenous
people. The country’s independence came about in 1825 under Bolivar, but the
indigenous majority was virtually unaffected by the change in leadership. The Spanish
were simply replaced by the criollo and mestizo elites that had played a hand in
perpetuating class divisions throughout the colonial era. Indigenous people were largely
viewed as subhuman and were treated as such. In fact, anti-Indian rhetoric was ramped up
to the point where, in 1864, President Melgarejo pronounced “all Indian communities”
extinct and proceeded to sell off large tracts of indigenous land to the highest bidder
(Canessa 2012, 202). Directly following this action came the Republican Law of
Communities (1866) and the Law of Disentailment (1874), which sought to quell
ongoing indigenous rebellions and further disenfranchise the indigenous majority (Kohl
and Farthing 2006, 35). Political instability has largely defined Bolivia’s history since the
inception of the independent nation, with the country holding the infamous world record
for most coups d’etat since 1825 (an astonishing 150) (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 37). This
tumultuous history features a series of governments led by criollo and mestizo military
leaders, none of which allowed for the integration of indigenous people into national
governance. Finally, after decades of political chaos, a revolution in 1952 thrust the
National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) into power and established Bolivia as a
democratic nation. Voting rights were expanded to all Bolivian citizens over 21, which
increased the electorate by five-fold. Though indigenous Bolivians were given the right
to vote, they were also given the designated classification of campesino- or rural farmer.
The creation of this social category appeased some persisting indigenous demands, but
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simultaneously allowed the government to continue indigenous suppression by seeking to
eliminate the “backwardness” associated with indigenous culture (Kohl and Farthing
2006, 48). By applying modernist theory adopted from Europe, the new government
could effectively work toward the creation of a mestizo nation by eliminating indigenous
identity. Despite continuous efforts to repress indigenous identities, indigenous people
constitute nearly two-thirds of Bolivia’s population. Today, 25 percent of Bolivia’s
indigenous population identifies as Aymara, compared to 31 percent Quechua. Lowland
indigenous groups account for only 6.1 percent of country’s total population, but are
distributed between 32 indigenous groups with rich cultural histories (Gigler 2009, 5). In
the coming chapters, we will see the ways in which continued indigenous activism
prevented that from happening and enabled the installment of the first indigenous
president.
Kohl and Farthing identify three thematic elements of Bolivia’s history that are
foundational facets of colonial legacies in South America. They are as follows: “the
appropriation of the country’s wealth by national and international elites, ongoing
resistance by the indigenous majority and tensions between the region and centre” (Kohl
and Farthing 2006, 34). That these elements are not unique to the Bolivian experience is
shown by the widespread trends in colonial practices and points to the creation of the
“Third World” through European imperialism, indicating that resulting social and
economic issues that have arisen in those countries are generally attributable to outside
systems and forces as opposed to internal mismanagement (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 34).
Further, the statement highlights the major themes in Bolivia’s history that have situated
the country to lead a climate justice charge against the established Western order.
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Climate Change in Bolivia
Bolivia presents a remarkably diverse climate composition that ranges from
tropical rainforest to alpine grasslands (Seiler et al 2012). This diversity is due to two
primary factors: the massive “flying river” emanating from the Amazon Rainforest and
the climatic barrier posed by the towering Andes Mountains (Forsberg 2015).
Surprisingly, the large majority of moisture found in Bolivia comes from the Atlantic
Ocean due to prevailing easterly trade winds that traverse the continent. These winds,
combined with the barrier presented by the Andes Mountains, prevent climatic interaction
between the majority of Bolivia’s land area and the Pacific. Often referred to as “the
lungs of the planet,” the Amazon Rainforest effectively pumps ocean moisture into the
interior of the continent, with each of the 600 billion trees found in the massive forest
acting as a “solar powered evaporation machine” (Forsberg 2015). The larger trees can
release up to 1000 liters of water per day as vapor, and the prevailing winds channel this
vapor into literal flying rivers that deliver up to 20 billions tons of water daily to the
interior of the continent (Forsberg 2015). This remarkable process allows the lowlands of
Bolivia to be one of the rainiest regions on the continent and provides the highlands with
the capacity to support massive reservoirs of water in glaciers and the impressive Lake
Titicaca. That the driest desert in the world, the Atacama, resides just west of the Andes
is a testament both to the enormity of the Andes and the shocking climatic diversity
present in the region (Forsberg Pers. Comm. 2017).
Climate change is perhaps most disruptive in regards to climate systems, which
generally depend upon consistent conditions throughout a broad region. One such system
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that is of particular importance to Bolivia is the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), a
Pacific climate pattern with El Niño representing the warm phase and La Niña
representing the cool phase. The ENSO system is largely responsible for determining the
amount of rainfall Bolivia receives. Though precipitation in the Andes comes from the
Atlantic, wind patterns over the Pacific caused by fluctuating water temperatures
determine the extent to which easterly trade winds over the Amazon can effectively
deliver moisture to the Bolivian highlands. During the El Niño phase, warm westerly
winds counteract the effect of the easterly trade winds, leading to drought in the altiplano
and surrounding regions (Vuille 2013, 1-2). It is thought that an interruption in the ENSO
cycle is largely responsible for the collapse of the Tiwanaku in the 11th century, when a
devastating 100 year drought disbanded the prehistoric civilization. Increasing global
temperatures pose a serious risk to the maintenance of ENSO climate patterns, which are
dependent upon temperature-driven oceanic circulation. Breaking this circulation system
would lead to unpredictability in weather patterns and potential for prolonged drought,
which could severely reduce the habitability of the altiplano.
Beyond their capacity as a pure wall of stone, the Andes serve as a compact
model for various latitudinal global climates. Elevation can serve as a proxy for latitude,
as each unit of elevation gain produces climatic changes equivalent to those experienced
if one were to travel toward either pole from the equator. This concept is made clear
through Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Depicting the climatological relationship between altitude and latitude (Forsberg
2017).

Thus, though Bolivia is one of the smaller countries in South America, it contains
nearly every fathomable climate found on earth. Indigenous people in Bolivia have long
known this to be true, and have adapted their agricultural practices to ensure that various
crops are growing in their most compatible climates. Figure 7 presents a model of
vegetation according to elevation.
While elevational climate differences have been effectively utilized to establish
vertically integrated agriculture schemes, climate volatility has the potential to
substantially disrupt agriculture in the highlands. Microclimates can be differentiated by a
matter of feet in the Andes, as climates transition rapidly according to elevation. While
many miles may separate latitudinal climatic environments, elevational climate changes
in the Andes occur in rapid succession. As such, temperature increases will shift
ecological zones that have been present for millennia in Bolivia, presenting a formidable
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risk to Bolivia’s highland farmers and the people and economies that depend upon their
production.

Figure 7: Showing the crops that grow most appropriately at respective elevations throughout the
Andes (Sklenář 2006).

Bolivia’s myriad climates depend upon several natural systems that are in dire
risk of fracture due to projected climate changes. While Bolivia serves as an exemplary
model for global climate processes, its intricate environment has the potential to be
devastated by rising temperatures and volatile climate conditions. Scientists M.B. Bush,
J. A. Hanselman and W. D . Gosling indicate that even a 1-2°C rise in temperature, which
the IPCC has deemed very likely, would be enough to turn the altiplano from a
productive grassland to an infertile highland desert (2010, 3223; IPCC 2018). To make
matters worse, given a 4°C increase in global temperatures, which the IPCC has
identified as the low end of a “business as usual” scenario by 2100, the altiplano would
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experience regional temperature changes of 7-10°C, which would fundamentally and
irreversibly alter the ecological components of the landscape (Hoffmann and Requena
2012; IPCC 2018). With over ⅓ of Bolivia’s labor force working in the agricultural
sector, the country has been identified as extremely vulnerable to climate change (Seiler
et al 2012). Even now, Bolivians are feeling the effects of a warming world. The
Chacaltaya glacier, once known for hosting the highest ski resort in the world, completely
disappeared in 2009. Fully half of the surface area of the 376 glaciers found throughout
the Cordillera Real range has disappeared since 1975, and rates of decline are rapidly
increasing. These worrying statistics are compounded by the fact that glaciers play a key
role in buffering against precipitation changes, as they contribute to groundwater
baseflow through annual melting. Without any safeguard against inevitable precipitation
variance, Bolivia may quickly be facing an agricultural crisis (Vuille 2013, 5-6).
The most recent IPCC report paints a dismal scene for the future of the planet if
drastic changes aren’t made soon. Scientists have asserted that global warming has
reached between 0.8-1.2°C, and state that “rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes
in all aspects of society” must be pursued if we are to stay under the 1.5°C threshold
(IPCC 2018). If this is true, it seems inevitable that Bolivia’s highlands will experience
massive ecological changes at a rate that will be difficult to manage without proper
resources. Bolivia’s most vulnerable, particularly those in the agricultural sector, are at
extreme risk in the coming years. Already, indigenous farmers are reporting difficulties in
maintaining traditional weather forecasting practices due to increased climate variability,
and have suffered massive losses in crops due to unpredictable climatic conditions
(DeAngelis 2013). Water sources for La Paz and other highland cities are rapidly
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diminishing as glaciers lose volume, lowland agricultural regions such as Chapare are
experiencing irregular flooding, and continued deforestation in the Amazon is
contributing to the fracture of Bolivian climate cycles (DeAngelis 2013). In fact, as
Bolivia is not a high-emitting country, 80 percent of Bolivia’s carbon emissions are
attributable to deforestation of the rainforest, which serves as a massive carbon sink for
the region (Forsberg 2015). In this time of climate crisis, Bolivians will need to fortify
their livelihoods if they are to survive impending disaster.
The IPCC’s 2014 report shows that highland Bolivia, a region demographically
dominated by indigenous, small-scale farmers, will be one of the most impacted foodproducing regions in all of Central and South America due to climate pressures (IPCC
2014, 46). The report goes on to note that the resilience of the region has been further
reduced by market integration of smallholder indigenous farmers, as such practices have
proven to impact the ability of indigenous farmers to orient their objectives toward
sustenance over commodification (IPCC 2014, 634). The precariousness of Bolivia’s
climate systems threatens even larger impacts within the coming decades if a “business as
usual” trajectory continues to be taken. These impacts will disproportionately affect
populations with less financial and material resources, which in Bolivia tend to be
indigenous communities due to a history of colonial-induced marginalization.

I have now established a foundation from which an analysis of contemporary
Bolivian politics and its convergence with international systems can be built. While much
of the information presented in this chapter has been synoptic, it is imperative that
historical themes, trends, and events be used to construct a supportive framework for

61
contemporary analysis in order that current events are not misattributed to unrelated
factors. Further, the structures upon which Bolivia’s political and economic systems rest
did not arise from a vacuum, but rather were generated through distinct historical
processes that, in large part, involved the subjugation of indigenous peoples and cultures
by Western entities. This economic, political, and social oppression has created a
vulnerability that will only be exacerbated by the climate changes projected by climate
scientists. The origin of the climate crisis is not a subject of this thesis, but the pressing
reality that effective solutions have yet to be implemented must be addressed. Going
forward, I will use global climate science and Bolivia’s history to inform a discussion of
climate justice and the continued tensions between the policy approaches of Bolivia and
the Western world.
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Chapter 3
Regional Trends and Domestic Policies in Bolivia
We have seen that Bolivia has been subjected to numerous difficulties throughout
its beleaguered past. We have also seen that Bolivia’s recent efforts toward cultural and
economic independence are monumental, as in many ways they represent the culmination
of centuries of indigenous resistance in the face of global powers. What has yet to be
seen, however, is the effect of ongoing neocolonial practices and the extent to which
Bolivia’s current administration has advanced the aims of climate justice. In the coming
chapter, I will investigate thematic elements of neocolonialism in the past century and use
that historicity to inform an analysis of contemporary Bolivian practices. Through this
lens, I can investigate Bolivia’s new administration and contrast their stated objectives
with their actual policy measures. I hope to highlight the international and domestic
influences that have shaped the actions of the current Bolivian administration, and in
doing so, establish a foundation for a discussion about the relevant barriers to climate
justice in the following chapter.

The US Rise To Power Following WWII
In order to gain a better understanding of the global economy, it is helpful to trace
the lineage of major historic events that have led to contemporary political
configurations. Richard Peet identifies the advent of globalization- “an intense
interchange of people, ideas, capital, and technology across international space”- as
occurring during the Pax Britannica, which extended approximately from 1875 to 1914
(2009, 37). During this time, European economics and political ideals dominated the
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international scene. Such ideals were imposed upon the non-industrialized world and
entrenched through imperial networks that allowed world trade to rise by an average of
34 percent in each of the five decades preceding WWI (Peet 2009, 37). The first World
War shattered British superiority and gave way to an inter-war period that saw the first
inklings of international economic cooperation amongst developed countries. Banks
rather than governments began dictating international economic affairs, and Wall Street
became an international economic hub. The Great Depression then tanked the global
economy, and World War II would yet again alter the status quo (Peet 2009, 39).
WWII was a shattering event for the global order. A mere two decades after
World War I, a war that left nearly 20 million European soldiers and civilians dead,
WWII deepened wounds and further weakened a European-led world order (Mougel
2011). Unsurprisingly, Latin American nations were not involved in the conflict, but the
resulting shift in global power dynamics would have resounding effects on policy
implementation in the Global South. The United States emerged from isolationism to
become a leading world power following WWII, and that rise was marked by the creation
of two key institutions that would shape the international landscape thenceforth: the IMF
and the World Bank. These institutions were created at the Bretton Woods Conference in
New Hampshire in 1944, a meeting of 44 nations that aimed to create a framework for
post-war peace (Peet 2009, 36). The meeting was led by the USA and the UK, both of
which had a vested interest in structuring the new global economy. The intent of Bretton
Woods was to induce widespread peace through international economic cooperation
based on a world market that would be regulated by global institutions that incorporated
input from all member states. Three institutions were envisaged by the conference: the
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IMF, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the
International Trade Organization (ITO). The IBRD would later become a facet of the
World Bank, and the ITO would become the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) before eventually transitioning to the WTO in 1995 (Peet 2009, 36).
Peet’s most compelling contribution is his discussion of the non-democratic
means by which global governance institutions were founded and the equally nondemocratic way in which they are now run. At the time of the Bretton Woods
Conference, the United States was expanding into a power gap abandoned by European
states suffering from the aftermath of WWII. The US economy had not fared as poorly
during the war as those in Europe, and its separate sphere of influence in the Western
hemisphere allowed the country to step into a position of international leadership (Peet
2009, 46). Economist Joan Spero bolsters Peet’s argument, noting that the United States
viewed its failure in leadership as a primary cause of world war, and sought to establish
itself as a global hegemon in order to ensure peace through liberal economic mechanisms
(Spero 2013). The United States and the United Kingdom, then the two world’s leading
political and economic powers, drew up a plan for global economic management through
“bilateral negotiation” (Spero 2013). Thus, decision making power was concentrated in
the hands of a small number of powerful states that were not challenged by countries that
came to be considered “third world” after WWII. Instead, those countries, including most
of African and Latin America, were “fully integrated into a world economy they neither
managed nor controlled” (Peet 2009, 47). Mid-20th century academic Michael Heilperin,
a vociferous supporter of US economic policy who called the United States’ ascension to
the world’s leading economic powers “one of the greatest epics of all times,” agrees that

65
the successes of the Bretton Woods Conference in creating a new world order were
largely due to the exclusion of most global states and the centralization of decision
making in the hands of the powerful (Heilperin 1952, 213). Resultant voting shares in the
institutions created reflect the imbalances present at their inception, as voting power is
determined by economic shares. While this may seem to be an equitable means of
distribution, it directly favors the nations that have the most economic power. As we have
seen, those nations are those that have long benefited from colonial enterprise in the
Global South.

Figure 8: The Brandt Line developed in the 1980s compared to countries making less than US
$10,700 per capita annually. Recent industrialization has made exceptions to the rule, but the
economic divide between the Global North and Global South remains apparent (Royal
Geographic Society 2017).

The Global North-Global South divide was made clear in the 1980’s through the
creation of the Brandt Line, which delineated the boundary between more and less
developed countries. Figure 8 shows the clear boundary that exists, with colonial powers
Europe and North America sitting atop formerly colonized nations in terms of wealth and
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geography. Today, the boundary is less easily defined, but it is still apparent that an
imbalance exists that favors the Global North. Such an imbalance is reflected in the
operations of global governance institutions, which disproportionately serve the will of
powerful states in the north.
The United States and Europe continue to dominate control of the IMF and the
World Bank. Governance is based on economic shares, which means that large states
have the most influence over international decisions in the Western order. Though the
United States’ voting share in the IMF is down from 30 percent to 17, the US continues
to exert deciding power. Because 85 percent consensus is needed to decide an action, a
no vote from the US effectively nullifies any given IMF initiative (Ikenberry 2008, 33).
Ann-Louise Colgan writes that “the World Bank and the IMF were important instruments
of Western powers during the Cold War in both economic and political terms,” citing
their promotion of “an economic agenda that sought to preserve Western dominance in
the global economy” (Colgan 2002). The control of the organizations substantiates
Colgan’s claims of Western dominance. As of 2002, as revolution raged in Bolivia, the
Group of 7 (US, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan) held over 40 percent
of the votes on both institutions’ Board of Directors. The US alone held 16.45 percent of
vote shares for the World Bank, and 17 percent of vote shares for the IMF (Colgan 2002).
Those numbers have not changed substantially to this day, with the United States holding
15.98 percent of vote shares in the World Bank as compared to Bolivia’s 0.14 percent
(World Bank 2019). The discrepancies are even more drastic in the IMF, where the
United States now represents 16.52 percent of total voting power while Argentina,
Paraguay, Uruguay, Peru, Chile and Bolivia combine at 1.59 percent (IMF 2019).
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Bolivia is not the only place that has experienced adverse effects from economic
policies enacted by the World Bank and IMF. A study by the Center for Economic Policy
Research (CEPR) following the implementation of SAPs in Argentina found that the IMF
was consistently wrong in its forecasting of growth given prescription to IMF policies. So
egregious were the miscalculations, authors Rosnick and Weisbrot concluded that “the
IMF’s large and repeated errors in projecting GDP growth in Argentina since 1999
strongly suggest that these errors were politically driven” (Rosnick and Weisbrot 2007,
2). What’s more, despite the IMF’s alleged commitment to poverty reduction, the
countries that face the worst levels of poverty have not benefited from IMF initiatives. In
1996, the IMF launched its Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) program that
sought to confront debt problems faced by the world’s poorest countries in order that they
may reallocate funds to supporting their populations. However, the 41 countries that the
IMF categorized as HIPCs saw no change in the trajectory of increasing indebtedness,
with total debt amongst the HIPCs rising from 60 billion dollars in 1980, to 105 billion in
1985, to 190 billion in 1990, and eventually 205 billion in 2000 (Peet 2009, 109). Such a
poor track record leaves little faith in future endeavors, particularly when compounded by
WTO policies that have served as lubricant for continued repression of poor countries
through liberal market mechanisms.
The WTO was the central antagonist in the global justice movements that
paralleled Bolivia’s push for decolonization and indigenous representation. Founded in
1995, the WTO became a more formal, institutionalized version of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that had been modeled from the ITO
established at Bretton Woods. GATT was designed to reduce barriers to trade by
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liberalizing markets and reducing tariffs, thus making it easier for the market to control
the flow of goods and services. Peet writes that the USA “wanted an organization that
would free up trade in the specific interest of large, exporting corporations, but with a
market-oriented, deregulated international economy more generally in mind” (Peet 2009,
180). The organization began to flounder in the 1970’s following a global market
recession, but was re-energized through the neoliberal reforms implemented in the 1980s.
A global push for neoliberalism, facilitated by the United States through the IMF and the
World Bank, called for a more powerful trade organization that would allow for the
deregulation called for by the Washington Consensus. Thus, in 1995, GATT was
strengthened and formalized to become the WTO. Though the WTO employs a more
equitable one country one vote leadership system, Peet notes that such a vote has never in
fact been take. Rather, decisions are made by consensus, and the United States has made
sure to influence that process by passing a Congressional stipulation that mandates US
departure from the WTO if three or more decisions are made against US interest within a
calendar year (Peet 2009, 190).
Sociology professor Jackie Smith writes that many WTO deliberations in its early
years were decided behind closed doors in the “Green Room” amongst what was then
termed “the Quad”- a coalition comprising the US, the European Union, Canada, and
Japan. These Western states pushed their agenda in these deliberations and then came
forth with proposals for the rest of the member states, many of which were enforced
through “secret agreements” made to countries that were “most vulnerable to pressure
from the powerful quad states” (Smith 2001, 3). The WTO is designed to be a “neutral”
institution, but the global justice movement made clear that the institution serves the
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interests of the wealthy few at the expense of the rest. In 1999, 30,000 protestors were
met with tear gas and rubber bullets in Seattle outside of the venue welcoming 5,000
attendees of the WTO’s Third Ministerial Conference, marking the largest of 3
consecutive protests against WTO annual conferences (Smith 2003, 1). Following the
protest, Jerry Mander and 60 other academics and economists at the International Forum
on Globalization put forth a document outlining the argument against the WTO. The key
points include that “the WTO has presided over the greatest transfer in history of real
economic and political power from nation-states to global corporations,” that the “WTO
has come to rival the IMF as one of the most powerful, secretive, anti-democratic bodies
and threatens to soon become the world’s first bona fide, unelected global government,”
that the “tribunals have consistently ruled against the environment and the interests of
Southern, undeveloped nations,” and finally that the “goal of the WTO is to expand the
freedoms of corporations to act beyond the reach of any national regulations and to
diminish the rights of national governments to regulate commerce on behalf of human
beings or nature” (Peet 2009, 236-237). The simultaneity of the WTO protests, the global
justice movement, Bolivia’s push for economic independence, and Latin America’s
rejection of neoliberalism indicates a broader system of Northern exceptionalism that
does not work for the majority of global citizens.
International affairs specialist John Ikenberry is particularly reverent of the United
States’ initiation of the Western order following WWII. He lauds the US for
implementing a global capitalist system with low barriers to entrance and potentially high
benefits accrued through market mechanisms. He writes that the US “did not simply
establish itself as the leading world power after World War II,” but “led the creation of
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universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought
democracies and market societies closer together” (Ikenberry 2008, 24). Historically
unique, the rules and institutions of the US led Western order “are rooted in, and thus
reinforced by, the evolving global forces of democracy and capitalism” (Ikenberry 2008,
28). Initiatives jump started at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 opened borders,
freed trade, and allowed for the entrance of many up and coming states. Ultimately,
Ikenberry posits, “the road to global power… runs through the Western order and its
multilateral economic institutions” (2008, 32). With a 2014 GDP of 17 trillion dollars, the
United States now represents over 20 percent of the entire global economy, a testament to
the degree to which the US has asserted itself as a global power (World Development
Indicators 2014).
This is all well and good for countries with the means to effectively engage in a
global capitalist market- namely those, such as China, with burgeoning industry and
hegemonic ambitions. For countries with deeply entrenched legacies of extractive
colonialism, the Western order is not so appealing. Even Ikenberry concedes that an
international order dominated by a powerful state “is based on a mix of coercion and
consent,” a mixture that inevitably disadvantages those with less pre-existing leverage
(2008, 28). For Bolivia, a country that has been systematically exploited for natural
resources for upwards of 500 years, engagement with the Western order is both
obligatory and sapping. Historically the poorest nation in South America, Bolivia suffers
from a resource curse that capitalizes on centuries of resource extraction facilitated by
disparities in Bolivia’s power relative to colonial states. Failures to eradicate poverty in
Bolivia prior to the current administration indicate that international efforts have not in
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fact been intended to aid the country, but rather to preserve its status as a virtual milkcow for the Western world. The lineage of United States intervention in Latin America is
not one of reciprocity, but one of bullying and opportunism.
Beyond maintaining the pathways of dependency and oppression between the
Global North and Global South, global governance institutions have been some of the key
contributors to industries that have created the climate change crisis. The World Bank
currently lends 1 billion dollars annually to oil and gas projects in developing countries, a
larger sum than the Bank’s allocated 993 million dollars toward climate change solutions
(Elliot 2017; World Bank: Data 2018). One to two percent of the World Bank’s 280
billion dollar portfolio is accounted for by oil and gas projects, which is a substantial sum
for such an influential body (Elliot 2017). The World Bank’s practices stand in stark
contrast to Bolivia’s trajectory under Evo. As the Morales administration organized the
World People’s Conference in 2010, World Bank annual fossil fuel investments were on
the rise from 1.6 billion dollars in 2007 to 6.3 billion dollars in 2010 (Bond 2012, 24).
That same year, the Bank issued its largest ever project loan to the Medupi coal-fired
power plant in South Africa, providing the fourth largest coal plant in the world 3.75
billion dollars (Bond 2012, 147-148). While lending for fossil fuel projects has decreased
in recent years, the Bank’s history does not inspire confidence in its ability to facilitate
climate change initiatives. The organization recently announced that it would desist
financing of upstream oil and gas after 2019, but the extent to which this commitment
represents structural change is in question (Elliot 2017).
Friends of the Earth, an international environmental organization, released a
statement on the results of COP16 in Cancun, which they contend “reflects the same
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negative outcome of the Copenhagen Accord in December, 2009” (Friends of the Earth
2010). The same statement highlighted a sentiment issued by Grace Garcia, a
representative of Friends of the Earth Costa Rica, who was quoted as saying “only a gang
of lunatics would think it is a good idea to invite the World Bank to receive climate
funds, with their long-standing track-record of financing the world’s dirtiest projects and
imposition of death-sentencing conditionalities on our peoples” (Friends of the Earth
2010). The Bolivian team at the Cancun COP, led by representative Pablo Solon, were
similarly disenchanted by the conference, and released a statement marking eight key
problems arising from the international meeting. One of these concerns was that the
World Bank was made the trustee of the newly established Green Climate Fund, a move
that has been “strongly opposed by many civil society groups due to the undemocratic
makeup of the Bank and its poor environmental record” (Buxton 2010). Ultimately, the
triad of global governance institutions have long served as operatives for the United
States policy interests, and in the age of climate change, those interests appear to be
oriented toward the maintenance of the Western order.
Kohl and Farthing are not hesitant to assert that in Bolivia the “legacy of
colonialism has created one of the most extreme cases of economic dependency in Latin
America,” and it is clear that such dependencies are fostered by the US through
neocolonial mechanisms (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 34). We have seen that global
governance institutions formulated by the United States continue to disproportionately
advantage the US in international affairs, but the reach of the Western hegemon extends
beyond institutional methods. In the coming section, I will show the ways in which the
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United States has historically exerted influence in Latin America in order to keep
extraction arteries open and pulsing.

Regional Neocolonial Trends
Bolivia is not the only Latin American nation that has been subjected to
contemporary resource exploitation along pathways initially created through intensive
colonialism. Rather, trade relationships in Latin America have been shaped by
international interests that have been most predominantly influenced in the past century
by the United States’ endeavors toward hemispheric hegemony. Interestingly, the United
States' efforts toward regional hegemony coincide with Latin American independence
movements that erupted throughout the first half of the 19th century. The lineage of US
foreign policy toward Latin America nucleates around the Monroe Doctrine, a
proclamation issued by the US government in 1823 (two years prior to Bolivia’s
independence) that requested European nations desist further colonization or
recolonization in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine was fortified in the
early 20th century by the Roosevelt Corollary, a document produced by the Roosevelt
administration that threatened the implementation of military force in Latin America in
an “exercise [of] international police power” in “‘flagrant cases of such wrongdoings or
impotence’” (Roosevelt 1905). The wrongdoings and impotence Roosevelt referred to
consisted of any failure by Latin American nations to fulfill their obligations to
international creditors, but such wrongdoings were assessed liberally, and the Corollary
was ultimately used as justification for subsequent intervention in Caribbean nations
through the late 1920s (Office of the Historian 2019).
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As military dictatorships and bureaucratic authoritarian regimes vied for political
control in the mid-20th century, the United States pressed to maintain oversight of Latin
America. Under the veil of pro-democracy and stability campaigns, the US sought to
quell leftist uprising and prevent the spread of communism emanating from revolutionary
Cuba. Director of US State Department Policy Planning staff George Kennan, known for
his communist containment policies during the Cold War, articulated the aims of the
United States in Latin America in direct terms. In his influential work entitled The Year
501, Noam Chomsky refers to Kennan as “clear-sighted,” citing his explicitly stated
directive of ‘“protection of our raw materials”’ in reference to US objectives in South
America (1993, 46). The use of the word “our” in Kennan’s statement implies US
ownership of Latin American resources and confirms thematic elements of manifest
destiny that permeate the history of US policy positions toward the Global South. Kennan
doubled down on this position when, in 1948, he asserted through the US Department
Policy Planning staff that ‘“we should cease to to talk about vague and...unreal objectives
such as human rights, the raising of living standards, and democratization,’” choosing
instead to focus on attempts to “maintain the ‘position of disparity’ that separates our
enormous wealth from the poverty of others’ (Chomsky 1993, 46). Not only did this clear
aim underscore sentiments of American superiority, it also starkly illuminated the
objectified role Latin America played in the eyes of United States diplomats.
The US built upon their hemispheric hegemony in the 1970s through Operation
Condor, a “covert inter-American program of political repression” that enacted the will of
the United States through unsavory methods such as torture, assassination, and
kidnapping (McSherry 2005, 28). Though the United States has never been publicly
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linked to Condor operations, there is overwhelming evidence pointing toward not only
their involvement, but their leadership. The 1959 Cuban Revolution spurred the
implementation of widespread covert military operations that sought to undermine
communist-inspired subversion. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents from that
era are heavily classified, but the information that has reached the public confirms that
the United States saw Condor as a legitimate “counterterrorism” effort (McSherry 2005,
28). It is evident that the United States worked to create military intelligence units and
train them in “psychological warfare, guerilla tactics, interrogation,” and other
mechanisms of subversion (McSherry 2005, 29). Interestingly, the US took tips from the
French, who used similar tactics in their attempts to extinguish anti-colonial efforts in
Algeria and Vietnam (McSherry 2005, 30). That colonial methods of oppression were
emulated by the United States should come as no surprise; the US may not have had a
hand in the earliest endeavors of Latin American colonialism, but their actions following
independence movements in the region are neocolonial in nature, as they have built upon
a foundation laid by European conquest.
Operation Condor affected many countries in Latin America, and Bolivia was no
exception. The most notable blow to the country was the assassination of former
nationalist president Juan Jose Torres in 1976, 5 years after his departure from office.
Torres was targeted due to his socialist views and his adoption of leftist policies that
attempted to nationalize industry and extricate Bolivia from a pattern of foreign
exploitation. Condor targeted less prominent figures as well, holding hundreds of
Bolivians in Orletti Motors, a torture facility that was designed to extract information
about leftist movements from suspected South American operatives (McSherry 2005, 37).
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Ultimately, Operation Condor served to ensure that the countries that offered the most
natural resources remained free from the clutches of leftist movements that would
internalize economies and prevent access to raw materials.
As Condor wreaked havoc throughout South America, the United States began
developing a plan to guide developing countries out of economic instability. The plan
rested on modernization theory- the notion that all countries must progress through a
process of development that mirrors Europe’s progression from feudalism to capitalism
(Rostow 1959). Modernization theory holds that poverty and underdevelopment can be
attributed to social values, and as such, tradition is something to be overcome rather than
integrated (Hellinger 2015, 157). Thus, underdevelopment is something that has
characterized all societies at some point in time, and the answer to that underdevelopment
is the implementation of market-based solutions that will elevate countries to a position
of material wealth that can then be used to raise living standards. The manifestation of
this theory as it pertains to South America was the Washington Consensus, an effort by
the United States to liberalize markets and drive down inflation rates. As was discussed
in Chapter 1, the World Bank and the IMF were used to implement austerity measures
that coercively subscribed Latin American countries to policies that aligned with the aims
of the Washington Consensus. However, influence of the United States in the
implementation of neoliberal policies in Latin America extends beyond the employment
of global governance institutions. Milton Friedman, professor at the University of
Chicago and a forefather of neoliberalism, taught a group of Chilean students that would
become known as the “Chicago Boys.” The Chicago boys played a key role in supporting
the military coup that implemented a right-wing militaristic government in Chile, and
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immediately implemented neoliberal policies following the overthrow of President
Allende in 1973 (Letelier 1976). The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
confirmed that the US provided financial backing for the coup, and had tasked the
Chicago Boys with creating a 300-page economic blueprint for the coup just prior to the
overthrow (Letelier 1976). Milton Friedman actually made multiple visits to Chile in
order to oversee the implementation of the neoliberal reforms that he called “shock
treatment” for the Chilean economy, and was quoted as saying the approach was “the
only medicine. Absolutely. There is no other. There is no other long-term solution”
(Letelier 1976). The reforms implemented in Chile would then be transcribed onto
economies throughout Latin America, directly following Friedman’s ideals.
Predictably, Bolivia was not the only country that rebuked the ineffective
neoliberal policies. In fact, resistance to neoliberalism resulted in an aggregate
phenomenon called the “Pink Tide,” marked by the election of Chávez in Venezuela in
1998, around the time that the water wars erupted in Bolivia (Hellinger 2015, 23). The
simultaneity of these events and the common experiences of the South American nations
provide further evidence of a broader system of outside influences that similarly affected
the region, pointing to the machinations of colonialism and resulting neocolonial
practices.
The historical trajectory of US policy positions toward Latin America is clearly
defined by persistent efforts to maintain regional hegemony and the material benefits that
come from economic control over a resource-wealthy region. From the Monroe Doctrine
to the Roosevelt Corollary to Kennan’s severe containment policies to Operation Condor
to the neoliberal era, the United States has pushed to ensure that extractive processes and
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pathways created by colonialism continue to be exploited for US benefit. Bolivia, a
country historically riddled with turmoil and revolt, has been particularly disadvantaged.
Materially poor and resource rich, Bolivia has only recently come to a position of
international resistance through indigenous driven demands for justice. These strides
have been more effective than any other in Latin America at reducing the influence of
neocolonial repressors. Evo Morales has not held back in his critique of United States,
and in two clear instances has acted to reduce direct US involvement in governmental
proceedings. The first instance came just after his election when, in 2008, Evo expelled
the US ambassador to Bolivia and several agents of the US Drug Enforcement Agency.
As a former cocalero, it is not surprising that Evo stood opposed to US drug policy, but
the removal of the ambassador spoke to a larger effort to extricate Bolivia from US
influence. Evo took the offensive again in 2013 by expelling the US Agency for
International Development (USAid) for their efforts to undermine his administration,
saying “the United States does not lack the institutions that continue to conspire”
(Associated Press in La Paz 2013). Evo’s expulsion of the United States embassy was not
merely a show of bravado, but a condemnation of the USA’s historic behavior toward
Bolivia.
Evo has also worked to reduce interactions with both the IMF and the World
Bank, recognizing their influence in perpetuating colonial inequalities. From 2005 to
2014, Bolivia reduced its public debt to the World Bank from 37 percent GDP to 9
percent GDP, and has spoken out against IMF recommendations that continue to push
privatization (Singham 2015). Despite these efforts, Bolivia received 300 million dollars
in project loans from the World Bank in 2018, a large uptick from the 96 million the
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country received in 2014 (World Bank 2018). Though it would appear that Bolivia is
reopening its mind to internationally-guided development, journalist Nate Singham
argues that Bolivia has taken control over the allocation and distribution of the funds
received (Singham 2015). According to Fundación Jubileo, a Bolivian institution founded
to extend the aims of the 2000s era Jubilee Movement, Bolivia is no longer subjected to
conditional loans, but is rather has “executive and administrative control” over the
funding it receives (Singham 2015). Further, a large bulk of the new funding comes in the
form of disaster and climate risk management, which aligns with Evo’s aims toward
climate justice. In fact, the 200 million dollar loan received in 2014 for risk management
after the early-2014 floods that left 50 dead and 411,500 affected was the largest loan
ever signed with the World Bank (Singham 2015). This loan does not indicate a position
reversal on behalf of the Morales administration, but rather a renegotiation of the way in
which Bolivia will proceed to interact with the international community. In citing
decolonization as a primary goal of the Plurinational State of Bolivia and in vociferously
admonishing the designs of capitalism, Evo is calling to attention the mechanisms by
which the United States has sought to maintain hemispheric hegemony and continue to
repress voices of revolution.
To gain further insight on Bolivia’s push for climate justice, we must investigate
internal as well as external factors. The TIPNIS controversy remains the most prominent
domestic event that would indicate contradictions in Evo’s messaging. By delving into
the dynamics of the infamous project, the forces at play will be made clear.
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TIPNIS
The Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS) road
construction controversy is the most explicitly contradictory action taken by the Morales
administration. The unwarranted use of force against lowland indigenous activists and the
persistence with which Evo pursued the project despite protest led many to wonder if
Evo’s support of indigenous people was merely a performative tactic to achieve political
success during a social moment that championed the indigenous activist. Further, it
brought into question inter-indigenous prejudice, highlighting the distinction between the
highland and lowland indigenous groups. Ismael Saavedra argues that the militaristic
response to protest against the road construction was merely a remnant of previous
administrations, and that it is not clear whether orders to contain protest came from Evo’s
administration (Saavedra Pers. Comm. 2018). Others, such as Nancy Postero, argue that
“because the MAS government continued its commitment to extracting natural resources,
it reinforced the racialized practices linked to it” (Postero 2017, 118). McNeish argues
along a similar vein, asserting that while the “country’s mineral and hydrocarbon wealth
has been nationalized and a new constitution and regime of social policy exists” that has
effectively “resulted in the formalization and expansion of political and social rights,
particularly for indigenous peoples,” there has nevertheless been “a significant expansion
of infrastructure and extractive industries … taking place that threatens the basis of their
livelihoods and hard-won autonomy” (McNeish 2013, 222-223). Despite variation in the
attribution of the causes for the 2011 police raid against protesters, all sources point to a
system of resource extraction that long preceded the Morales administration. While Evo
and the MAS have continued and in some cases advanced Bolivia’s reliance on extractive

81
industries, the conditions under which they have done so have been indisputably more
equitable for Bolivian people (See page 84). This is not to excuse violent actions taken
under Evo’s watch, nor to condone the continuance of extractive practices, but rather to
question the extent to which the Morales administration is at fault for such transgressions.
In order to gain a better understanding, we must delve deeper.
The development project through the TIPNIS protected region had dubious
beginnings as it appears that the 63 Moxeño, Yuracaré, and Chimane communities that
reside in the protected region were not informed of the road construction before it began.
Though this would seem to fly in the face of Evo’s social aims, the Morales
administration took an “intransigent stance” when confronted by further domestic protest
and outrage about the treatment of the activists (Postero 2017, 123). Despite Evo having
projected an image of resistance to international influences, it appears that the TIPNIS
project would align with the aims of a continental development project called Initiative
for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), which aims
to open trade corridors throughout the region in an effort to access and more easily
transport available fossil fuels (Postero 2017, 127). The project was pushed by a coalition
of South American governments, but its funding came from multilateral development
banks and World Bank subsidiaries such as the Andean Development Corporation, the
Inter-American Development Bank, and the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES)
(International Rivers 2008). It is also clear that the project dovetails with fossil fuel
related initiatives that have been undertaken between Bolivia and Brazil in the past. Evo
rescinded the contract to build the road in 2011, but not after substantial damage had been
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done both to the TIPNIS region and to Evo’s reputation as a champion of indigenous
peoples (BBC 2011).
Interestingly, this is not the first time we have seen a project such as this
employed in South America. The World Bank pushed a similar development project in
Brazil during the early 1980s. From 1981-1983, Brazil received $443.4 from the
multilateral institution to build the 1,500 kilometer Polonoroeste road that connected
Brazil’s burgeoning industrial center with the northwest tropical rainforest (Tauli-Corpuz
2006, 50). A region the size of France was affected by the project, nearly all of it
rainforest inhabited by forty tribal groups with approximately 10,000 indigenous
Brazilians. The project turned out to be disastrous in both environmental and
humanitarian terms. Half a million settlers arrived to the region to establish cocoa and
coffee plantations, and their arrival was not quiet. Deforestation increased from 1.7
percent in 1978 to 16.1 percent in 1991, influenza and measles epidemics ravaged
indigenous populations, and up to 250,000 people in the region contracted malaria. The
resulting health crisis led the World Bank to pump in another $99 million to spray 3,000
tons of DDT to combat the mosquito borne disease (Tauli-Corpuz 2006, 50). Projects
such as these clearly disadvantage indigenous populations, but the effects of the
Polonoroeste road were even more broad-reaching. It was evident that the financiers of
the project did not have adequate knowledge of the land nor of the blowback that resulted
from their mislead endeavors. Driven by developmental notions that promised progress
and financial benefit, the World Bank failed to consult the people that would be most
affected by the project. In doing so, the indigenous residents of the northwest tropical
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rainforest were dehumanized and cast to the side in favor of an initiative that would
contribute to severe and irreversible ecological and humanitarian harm.
While the Polonoroeste is not TIPNIS, the parallels between the two projects are
eerily apparent. In both cases, road construction began without consent of the indigenous
residents, the projects have been financed by multilateral development banks, and the
ultimate objective of the projects has been to increase access to natural resources in
previously undeveloped rainforests. Perhaps more concerning is the fact that Brazil seems
to have forgotten the damage wrought by the Polonoroeste road, or otherwise has chosen
to ignore the disastrous precedent for the sake of economic gain. That the BNDES and
Inter-American Development Bank, subsidiaries of the World Bank created in alignment
with the post-WWII economic restructuring efforts, are financing this new project is also
highly concerning. While the World Bank does not directly have a hand in the
construction of the road through TIPNIS, the ideological remnants of the Polonoroeste
project have clearly been recycled by the regional offshoot banks.
External funding sources for the TIPNIS road project do not excuse the
complicity of the Morales administration, but they do provide international context for
what would otherwise seem to be a domestic conflict. The construction of the road has
stopped, but the development project remains emblematic of the contradictions that exist
within the Morales-led government. Prominent Aymara leader Rafael Quispe stated that,
through the TIPNIS police raid, “‘the government has revealed its true identity. The
indigenous mask has fallen off, and its neoliberal face is revealed’” (Postero 2017, 127).
Postero largely agrees with this sentiment, identifying the central paradox of the state as
the “tension between the desire to overturn colonialism and all of its legacies and the use
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of liberal state mechanisms to do so” (Postero 2017, 14). Ahead, I will investigate Evo’s
policies to gain a better understanding of the contradictions that exist within his platform.

Morales Administration Policies
It has been made clear to this point that the Morales administration has
experienced its share of successes and pitfalls. What cannot be mistaken is the degree to
which the Morales administration has improved the Bolivian economy and reduced
poverty rates. Though Bolivia is historically the poorest country in South America, the
country closed out the 2018 fiscal year with one of the highest growth rates across all of
Latin America. With an average GDP growth rate of 4.9 percent between 2006 and 2017,
Bolivia has successfully elevated 3 million citizens out of poverty under Evo (Telesur
2018).

Figure 9: Bolivian GDP from 1960-2017. Note the tremendous jump in GDP from 2005 (9.549
billion dollars) to 2017 (37.509 billion dollars) (World Bank Indicators 2019).
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Figure 10: Gross national income per capita from 1960-2017. Again, note the steep upward
trend under Morales, from 1,030 dollars/year in 2005 to 3,130 dollars/year in 2017 (World Bank
Indicators 2019).

Even the IMF has acknowledged that Bolivia’s past 15 years have been a
monumental success, releasing a statement congratulating the country on “strong growth
and poverty reduction” under the Morales administration (Telesur 2018). In a telling
response, Bolivian vice president Alvaro Garcia Linera said that the IMF “is an external
source that checks our data and is proving that we are growing more than last year, but
we have never paid attention to its recommendations nor are we going to pay attention to
it, because our economic model is different from the economic model they are driving”
(Telesur 2018). Such an obstinate approach is consistent with the messaging that has
emanated from the Morales administration, which has vilified the Western order and the
employment of capitalist systems that perpetuate anthropogenic climate change.
However, the question still remains: how can Bolivia oppose capitalism and advance the
aims of climate justice while engaging in market mechanisms that continue to promote
extractive industries?

86
The answer is not an easy one. The most useful framework is perhaps the
progressive extractivism model presented by Eduardo Gudynas, the same system that
Webber refers to as reconstituted neoliberalism (See Chapter 1). Evo’s pursuit of
development projects such as TIPNIS and continued reliance on fossil fuels, lithium, and
rare metal ores stands in stark contrast to his international anti-capitalist, pro-earth
messaging, but his domestic policies have been astronomically effective in terms of
poverty reduction and economic growth based in nationalization. Article 9 of Bolivia’s
new constitution addresses this policy approach succinctly, identifying one of the primary
aims of the state being “to promote and guarantee the responsible and planned use of
natural resources, and to stimulate their industrialization through the development and
strengthening of the productive base in its different dimensions and levels, as well as to
preserve the environment for the welfare of present and future generations” (Constituent
Assembly 2009). Bolivians demand the right to industrialize their economy in order to
free themselves from a position on the bottom of a global wealth hierarchy, but to do so
requires the maintenance of extractive industries. These measures have come alongside
gradually rising carbon emissions, but Bolivia’s contribution to global totals is virtually
irrelevant compared to more industrial countries. In 2017, the United States was
responsible for emitting 5,270 metric tons of carbon, representing approximately 15
percent of global totals. Bolivia, the 85th largest emitter in the world, was responsible for
21 metric tons of carbon, contributing to less than 1 percent of total emissions (Global
Carbon Atlas 2017). The disparity in historical emissions is much larger, as Bolivia has
only recently begun industrializing.
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Figure 11: Bolivia’s historic climate emissions from 1960-2014, measured in metric tons per
capita. Under Morales, emissions have risen from 1.622 metric tons to 1.932 metric tons (World
Bank Indicators 2019.

A look at Bolivia’s primary industries reflects the extent to which Bolivia remains
strapped by foreign demand for fossil fuels and mined resources. In 2014, 54 percent of
Bolivia’s export revenue came from hydrocarbons, primarily in the form of natural gas
and oil (Energy Information Association 2015). Other substantial exports include zinc
ore, gold, other precious metal ores, raw tin, and a variety of agricultural products. Of all
exports, only 18.9 percent are not mined or drilled natural resources (Observatory of
Economic Complexity 2019). Overall, 90 percent of Bolivia’s exports are raw materials,
showing that the country has not emerged from a colonial framework of resource
dependence (Smith 2018). These statistics point not only to Bolivia’s resource wealth, but
also to the repression of industrialization that comes with a history defined by extraction
for the benefit of those abroad.
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Further insights arise from an overview of Bolivia’s primary trading partners. In
1990, during the heyday of the neoliberal era, Bolivia exported 27 percent of all goods to
the United States, topped only by the 31 percent to Argentina. Of the remaining 42
percent, 20 percent of exports were directed to countries in Europe, showing the extent to
which Bolivia’s resources were consumed by colonial powers (Observatory of Economic
Complexity 2019). Under the Morales administration, Bolivia has diversified its trading
partners and substantially diminished exports to both Europe and the United States,
allocating them only 11.4 and 6.7 percent of exports, respectively. Nonetheless, the
United States remains one of the top five consumers of Bolivian goods (Observatory of
Economic Complexity 2019). Further, though Evo increased hydrocarbon revenue as a
percentage of GDP from 9.8 to 35 percent between 2005 and 2013 through
nationalization efforts, he has reduced the amount of exported hydrocarbons as a
percentage of total exports through diversification of exported products (Observatory of
Economic Complexity 2019). Nonetheless, in holding with Bolivia’s National
Development Plan, the Bolivian government increased hydrocarbon gas production from
33 million cubic meters in 2005 to 56 million cubic meters in 2013 (Singham 2015). The
2016-2020 National Economic and Social Development Plan likewise highlights
hydrocarbon exploration and further industrialization of natural gas in the coming years
(World Bank 2018). Though extraction rates have increased under Morales, it is
important to note that such increases are largely a result of the exploration initiatives
incentivized by neoliberal reforms through the 1990s. Privatization of the oil industry led
to drastically increased extraction rates, with natural gas extraction rates rising by over
200 percent between 1999 and 2000 alone (Kohl 2002, 459). Thus, Evo’s economic plan
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virtually maintains extraction patterns yet has vastly increased revenue from
nationalization. In 2005, revenue from fossil fuels came to 0.6 billion dollars, but by
2014, that number increased by more than sevenfold to 4.5 billion dollars (Smith 2018).
Bolivia is simultaneously attempting to cut dependencies by internalizing their
agricultural economy, with 95 percent of Bolivia’s food now coming from within the
country (Smith 2018). Agricultural independence follows with Bolivia’s efforts toward
decolonization, but leaves the country vulnerable given impending climate pressures in
the agriculture sector.
Evo has made good on MAS platform promises by investing in social programs
that were stripped of funding during the neoliberal era. In his first year in office, Morales
increased spending on health, education, and poverty reduction by 45 percent, an
endeavor that would ultimately lead to unprecedented social renewal in Bolivia (Dover
2017). Extreme poverty rates in Bolivia now hover around 17 percent as opposed to the
38 percent rate in 2005, and income inequality has been drastically reduced (Postero
2017, 99).

Figure 12: Income growth by wealth decile from 2006-2012. As can be seen, each successive
income tier has grown more than the one above it (Johnson and Lefebvre 2014).
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Figure 13: Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines from 200 to 2016. From 2000 to
2016, poverty rates were reduced from 66.4 percent to 39.5 percent (World Bank Indicators
2019).

Washington Post columnist Francisco Toro writes that the richest 10 percent in
Bolivia earned 128 times more than the poorest 10 percent prior to the Morales
presidency, but now, those same groups are differentiated by just 38 fold (Toro 2017).
The ramifications of these measures for rural indigenous populations has been
astronomical. In 2000, the rural poverty gap, reflecting the degree to which average rural
income differed from average urban income, was a soaring 65.4 percent. By 2014, that
rate had dropped by more than half of the original value, coming in at 30.5 percent
(World Bank 2019). Reductions in overall poverty levels and a diminishing rural poverty
gaps show that Bolivia is simultaneously mitigating historic internal marginalization and
addressing global inequalities that have affected the entire population.
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Figure 14: Rural poverty gap in Bolivia from 2000 to 2014 (World Bank Indicators 2019).

The budget surpluses that Bolivia experienced every year between 2006 and 2014
allowed public sector debt to fall from 83 percent of GDP in 2003 to a mere 26 percent in
2014, enabling Bolivia’s international reserves to be built up from 1.7 billion dollars in
2005 to 15.1 billion dollars in 2014 (Toro 2017). International reserves insulate against
market downturns and reduce the need for international loans. Evo’s policies have also
sought to decrease gender disparities in the workplace and have succeeded in increasing
women's participation in formal sector employment from 37 percent in 2008 to 46
percent in 2018 (Cuevas 2019). These efforts align with the aims of the indigenous
activist group CONAMAQ that have sought to destabilize the patriarchal systems that
were imposed upon indigenous societies by colonizers (Cuevas 2019).
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Figure 15: International reserves as a percentage of GDP from 2003 to 2013 (Johnston and
Lefebvre 2014).

These economic strides paced the employment of social programs that have
increased literacy rates, improved access to healthcare, brought electricity to rural
communities, and sliced poverty rates.

Figure 16:Access to electricity from 2005 to 2016. Over that period of time, national access to
electricity jumped from 68.288 percent to 93.039 percent (World Bank Indicators 2019).
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Figure 17: Rural access to electricity from 2006 to 2016. Under Morales, rural access to
electricity has increased from 28.896 percent to 79.145 percent (World Bank Indicators 2019).

Within the first 6 years of his presidency, Evo had doubled the amount of health
centers in the entire country, including the rehabilitation of 60 rural health posts. Before
2009, two thirds of Bolivian municipalities had no health posts, but by 2012, over half of
the previously underserved municipalities had healthcare centers (Kohl and Farthing
2014, 111). More recently, Evo rolled out a universal healthcare plan that will cover at
least 70 percent of all Bolivians, benefitting up to 5 million previously uninsured
residents between the ages of 5 and 59 (Nueva 2019). This unprecedented success reflects
the 300 percent increase in healthcare spending that Bolivia has undertaken since 2006.
The healthcare inauguration ceremony held on March 1, 2019 was attended by Pan
American Health Organization (PAHO) and World Health Organization (WHO)
representative Fernando Leanes, who lauded Bolivia’s strides in the realm of healthcare
under the Morales administration. Leanes stated “the results are extraordinary in public
health and collective health. They can be seen in the reduction of infant mortality, child
malnutrition, number of professionally-attended births, diseases under control and
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population's healthy life years,” tipping his cap to the free care provided by 3,100 first,
second, and third level care facilities in Bolivia (Nueva 2019). The WHO and PAHO
further praised Bolivia by congratulating the country for occupying first place in Latin
America in terms of “shared prosperity,” and for being the country that has most
effectively reduced extreme poverty in all of Latin America (Nueva 2019). Healthcare
specialist Anthony Costello notes that climate change poses substantial healthcare risks
ranging from worsening air quality and changing patterns of vector borne diseases to the
causalities incurred by climate induced disasters (Costello 2013). By fortifying healthcare
within Bolivia, Evo has made major strides in elevating climate resilience nationwide.
Bolivia has also been effective in its establishment of other socially funded
services outside of healthcare. The most significant are the Renta Dignidad, a pension
fund that reached over 750,000 Bolivians over the age of 60 as of 2014, and the Bono
Juancito Pinto, an education reform initiative that provides funding for all Bolivian
children through the eighth grade (Kohl and Farthing 2014, 101-102). The “Yes I Can”
literacy campaign established in 2006 has paralleled the Bono Juancito Pinto initiative in
efforts to eradicate high illiteracy rates. In 2000, Bolivia suffered from the highest
illiteracy rates in South America, particularly in rural areas where illiteracy reached up to
40 percent (Kohl and Farthing 2014, 105). The program effectively reduced illiteracy
rates from 13.28 percent in 2001 to 3.8 percent by 2014 (Abreu and Silva 2016). The
illiteracy rate continues to fall, hitting an historical low of 2.9 percent in 2016. The push
for literacy has also incorporated 36 indigenous languages, aligned with Evo’s efforts to
chip away at all remnants of colonial infrastructure (Walker 2016). Also notable is the
Juana Azurduy subsidy established in 2008 which grants pregnant and nursing women
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consistent funding and has contributed to the halving of maternal mortality rates between
2006 and 2010 (Kohl and Farthing, 2014, 102).

Reducing Climate Vulnerability
Evo’s social policies have had a profound effect on climate vulnerability. As can
be seen in the following graph produced by the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative,
Bolivia’s ND-GAIN score (inversely reflective of climate change vulnerability) has risen
substantially under Evo’s leadership, with a sharp spike occurring immediately after Evo
assumed office in 2006.

Figure 18: ND-GAIN country Index score from 1995 to 2017 for Bolivia. Notice the distinct spike
in resilience immediately following Evo’s election in 2005 (Notre Dame Global Adaptation
Initiative 2019)

The parallelisms between Evo’s socioeconomic advancements and a reduction in
climate vulnerability despite ever advancing rates of climate change show the extent to
which social fortification plays a role in defending against climate change. Advancing
education systems allows the populous to develop climate smart practices and defend
against unjust mechanisms of exploitation that have led to climate vulnerability.
Overhauling an underserved healthcare system reduces casualties associated with climate
change and produces a society that is better equipped to face drastic climatic shifts.
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Reducing income inequality ensures that the poorest sectors of society will not face
wildly disproportionate climate impacts as the wealthy seek to insulate themselves from
damage. Further, reducing income inequality and lowering the rural poverty gap has
played a major role in diminishing indigenous marginalization and attacking the systems
that have institutionally oppressed the indigenous majority. Ultimately, Evo has produced
a more equitable Bolivia, which in turn has advanced climate justice within Bolivia’s
borders. In the coming chapter, I will work to uncover the role Bolivia plays in advancing
climate justice on an international scale through a more detailed investigation into global
political and economic process paired with the lineage of climate justice.
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Chapter 4
Bolivia’s Climate Paradox
Bolivia exemplifies the complex dynamics of climate change and resulting
resolution mechanisms. Highly vulnerable to climate change, a history rife with
colonialism and social unrest, and a relatively new indigenous driven government that is
bucking the Western order, Bolivia has emerged as an exciting and potentially confusing
global actor. Factors such as Evo’s fiery rhetoric, the development of a new indigenous
oriented environmentally conscious national constitution, and the creation of a World
People’s Agreement that amplifies the voices of subaltern people across the globe are
enough to send climate activists clamoring for worldwide emulation. On the other hand,
unscrupulous methods and extractive practices enacted by the Morales administration
raise questions about Bolivia’s commitment to combating global processes of oppression
and pollution. In the coming chapter, I elucidate the role Bolivia plays in the climate
justice movement and the barriers that the country faces in achieving its projected vision.
By situating Bolivia’s efforts within the broader context of climate change solutions, and
by contrasting Bolivia’s approach with that of the international community, I will point to
the ways in which Bolivia represents a new climate paradigm. Additionally, I will place
Bolivia and the rhetoric that has emanated from the Morales administration within the
canon of climate justice, and in doing so, address the manifestations of climate justice
since the movement’s inception. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I will bring
together the narrative that I have developed throughout this thesis to discuss the barriers
Bolivia faces and the broader implications of Bolivia’s position.
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Climate Justice
Climate justice has its foundations in the 1980s and 1990s environmental justice
movement that first explicitly connected environmental degradation with social
inequities. From there, the call for climate justice began echoing through progressive
movements in South America that comprised the Pink Tide, combatting neoliberal
policies with leftist ideals. The call for justice came most prominently from Ecuador,
where the environmental group Acción Ecológica promoted a justice-based approach to
environmental regulation prior to the Kyoto Protocol (Bond 2012, 187). The Jubilee
movement that took place through the 1990s demanded the cancellation of debt owed by
35 of the poorest nations to global powers, and garnered 24 million signatures across 62
nations (Advocacy International 2019). Coinciding with this initiative was the global
justice movement, a series of coordinated activism efforts that sought to combat
corporate globalization, culminating in the infamous 1999 WTO protest in Seattle (Smith
2001).
After the coining of the term “climate justice” in the 1999 CorpWatch document
“Greenhouse Gangsters vs Climate Justice,” climate justice took hold on an international
scale (Widdick 2018). The 2002 Bali Principles of Climate Justice developed by an
international coalition of environmental groups then provided a template for ongoing
climate justice efforts, and inspired the formation of the Durban Group for Climate
Justice, a group of environmentalists and corporate critics that produced “The Durban
Declaration on Carbon Trading,” a document detailing the inadequacies of carbon trading
as a method to combat climate change (Bond 2012, 187; Widdick 2018). This lineage of
climate justice activism spurred the formation of the most pivotal climate justice
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organization that has been founded to date, Climate Justice Now! The organization is a
network of social groups and movements across the globe seeking to find just avenues for
climate change combattance. Climate Justice Now! was founded at the 2007 Bali COP to
fight for “social, ecological, and gender justice” on behalf of affected communities
(Widdick 2018). Their operating principles focus on five key precepts as follows:
● leaving fossil fuels in the ground and investing instead in appropriate
energy-efficiency and safe, clean and community-led renewable energy;
● radically reducing wasteful consumption, first and foremost in the North,
but also by Southern elites;
● huge financial transfers from North to South, based on the repayment of
climate debts and subject to democratic control. The costs of adaptation
and mitigation should be paid for by redirecting military budgets,
innovative taxes and debt cancellation;
● rights-based resource conservation that enforces Indigenous land rights
and promotes peoples’ sovereignty over energy, forests, land and water;
● sustainable family farming and fishing, and peoples’ food sovereignty
(Climate Justice Now! 2012).
As can be seen above, the demand for climate justice is framed in terms of tensions
between the Global North and Global South, with a prominent focus on the dynamic
present between indigenous and colonizing people. These tensions undergird systems of
climate injustice, and the Bolivian government under Evo Morales has been at the fore of
recognizing and acting upon such imbalanced power dynamics.
Climate justice has since become part of climate platforms for many NGOs and
grassroots organizations such as 350.org, the Mary Robinson Foundation, Grassroots
International, the NAACP, Greenpeace International, and others. The articulations of
climate justice from each of these groups revolve around two prominent factors: holding
corporations and emitters accountable, and reducing consumption in the Global North so
that those in the Global South may find the means to reduce vulnerability and rise out of
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poverty. While the 2010 World People’s Conference may not have initiated this
movement, it certainly served as a global megaphone through which the grievances of
140 nations could be heard and echoed by organizations and countries around the world.
The World People’s Conference was a momentous step in the climate justice movement.
The voices of grassroots activists were amplified in the wake of the conference,
empowered by a defiant stance against climate stagnation and global imbalances. The
conference spearheaded movements throughout the world, many of which prominently
featured indigenous activists. The Navajo have played a major role in stopping coal
mining projects in New Mexico, REDOIL (Resisting Environmental Destruction on
Indigenous Lands), an Alaskan indigenous coalition, has countered projects by Shell and
other oil companies, indigenous communities along the Klamath River in Oregon have
reversed industrial hydropower projects, and native communities have been at the fore of
fighting against the implementation of oil pipelines in the Midwest (Bond 2012, 188190). The World People’s Conference in Cochabamba did not start a swell of indigenous
activism; indigenous people have been pointing out false solutions and combating
environmental damage for decades. The conference did, however, provide the largest
platform to date that has been available for subaltern people to project climate justice
demands. While those demands have not fallen on deaf ears, they have certainly been
heard by reluctant ones.
The set of demands put forth by the Bolivian government and the World People’s
Agreement have not been agreeable to the Western world. The text of the conference
incriminates US practices, noting that while developed countries reduced their emissions
by 11.2 percent between 1990 and 2007, the United States increased their emissions by
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16.8 percent over that same period (World People’s Conference on Climate Change and
the Rights of Mother Earth 2010). The document further claims to “categorically reject”
the Copenhagen Accord of 2009, calling it “illegitimate” due to the voluntary and
individual reduction commitments that will not bring sufficient reductions in greenhouse
gases (World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth
2010). Patrick Bond (2012, 198) identifies ten particular demands that have arisen from
Bolivia that are incompatible with Western practices and norms:
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

50 per cent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2017;
stabilising temperature rises to 1°C and 300 parts per million;
acknowledging the climate debt owed by developing countries;
full respect for human rights and the inherent rights of indigenous people;
universal declaration of rights of Mother Earth to ensure harmony with
nature;
establishment of an International Court of Climate Justice;
rejection of carbon markets and commodification of nature and forests
through the REDD programme;
promotion of measures that change the consumption patterns of developed
countries;
end of intellectual property rights for technologies useful for mitigating
climate change; and
payment of 6 per cent of developed countries’ GDP to addressing climate
change.

As can be seen, this agenda aggressively pursues climate justice and makes demands that
far overstep the boundaries that have been set by the Western order. Thus far, most of the
goals set at the Conference have not been met due to pushback from developed countries.
Greenhouse gases have not seen remotely close to a 50 percent reduction, atmospheric
carbon has skyrocketed to over 410 parts per million, there is no International Court of
Climate Justice, and developed countries have certainly not been willing to allocate 6
percent of their GDP to climate change mitigation (Kahn 2017). Global North rejection of
the demands developed at the World People’s Conference is not surprising, for the
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Conference did not fall within the structures created by Western elites to address matters
of global economy and international affairs. The United States has taken a step beyond
ignorance, however. Threatened by the coalition formed in Cochabamba, the United
States withdrew several million dollars of aid funding to Bolivia and Ecuador due to the
countries’ opposition to the Copenhagen Accord (Bond 2012, 90).
At the following COP in Cancún, Bolivia was similarly snubbed. Bolivian
Ambassador to the UN Pablo Salon writes that the resolutions developed at the World
People’s Conference were entirely ignored at the conference, with discussion instead
focused on stripping away any emission reductions commitments remaining from the
Kyoto Protocol. Further, after having been given two hours to read the text of the Cancún
Agreement, the document was passed despite Bolivia’s requests for extended discussion
and ultimate dissent (Solon 2010). Solon called the result a “false agreement” and stated
that despite US financial punishments through cuts to climate funding, “we are not
beholden to the World Bank, as so many of us in the south once were. We can act freely
and do what is right” (Solon 2010). Bolivia’s independence from the Western order and
its institutions allows the country to be forward in its dissent, yet has not proven to
change the course set by the United States.
A second (though lesser attended) World People’s Conference on Climate Change
and the Rights of Mother Earth held in Bolivia in 2015 continued to push for the
approach highlighted at the preceding conference, but yet again failed to gain recognition
from the United States. The Conference came just before COP21 in Paris in the hopes of
highlighting the voices of the Global South, but the Paris COP proved to be just as
disappointing as those previous. The Paris Agreement produced at COP21 abandoned any
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previously held notions about an international equitable burden-sharing arrangement to
control and reduce carbon emissions, an idea that arose from the Kyoto Protocol. In doing
so, the Agreement “effectively sidelined equity and environmental justice considerations
as a guiding principal for multilateral cooperation” (Clémençon 2016). Shortly thereafter,
US President Donald Trump made removal from the already lenient Paris Agreement a
priority for his administration, confirming the US position toward climate change
resolution.
We have seen this strong-handed approach before, and it will not be the last time
the climate justice movement is opposed by those that stand to lose less from climate
change. Fortunately, there are not only those that continue to fight global injustice, but
also those that report on the inequalities that lead to mass climate vulnerability. Patrick
Bond has contributed to the climate justice lineage by producing one of the most
comprehensive works on climate justice and associated political processes to date,
entitled Politics of Climate Justice: Paralysis Above, Movement Below. The work is the
most preeminent within the relatively nascent literary canon of climate justice, and has
inspired a litany of climate justice books from 2012-2019, including those by Mary
Robinson, Henry Shue, Wen Stevenson, and even a textbook by Dominic Roser and
Christian Seidel.

International Solutions to Climate Change
The global response to climate change has been overwhelmingly ineffective. 2018
saw a record high in carbon emissions, rising by 2.7 percent from the previous year
(Global Carbon Project 2018). The world’s top emitters, the United States, China, and
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India, increased carbon output by 2.5, 4.7, and 6.5 percent, respectively, and global
carbon emissions hit a sickening 37.1 billion tons (Global Carbon Project 2018). The
IPCC “Global Warming of 1.5°C” 2018 report confirmed worries that climate change is
accelerating and will be impacting millions of people by the middle of the century (IPCC
2018). Seventeen of the eighteen hottest years in history have taken place in the 21st
century, and an estimated 325 million people are seriously affected by climate change
every year, including 315,000 that are killed by human-induced climate changes
(UNFCCC 2017). All this, despite the 25 United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties (COP) that have been held
specifically to address climate change since 1995, along with several international
greenhouse gas reduction agreements starting with the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The
inability of the international community to come to pragmatic and effective solutions to a
such a massive global threat can in large part be attributed to the very same structures that
have shaped the international sphere since the second World War.
The United Nations, another postwar institution conceptualized and founded in
the United States, has been at the fore of climate change mitigation talks. The UNFCCC
has provided a platform for countries to come together to discuss change, but the COP
has reflected the power imbalances that exist among member nations. The primary
approach that has been undertaken by the international conferences has been one that
Patrick Bond has termed “climate-crisis capitalism” (2012, 2). Elites attending the COP
have pushed this methodology by insisting that market mechanisms will ensure emissions
reduction through carbon trading and the commodification of carbon sinks such as
forests. Carbon trading was a core strategy of the Kyoto Protocol, lauded as the climate
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solution that would allow for continued business growth coupled with incentives to
pursue less polluting energy alternatives. The European Union’s Emission Trading
System (ETS) was implemented in 2005, but quickly fell victim to market volatility and
structural issues. The carbon market experienced an immediate dip in 2006 after it was
discovered that too many emissions permits had been issued, and then suffered a
monumental collapse as a result of the 2008 global financial crisis (Bond 2012, 41).
Though estimates placed an effective price to support alternative energy programs at 50
euros per ton of carbon, the price per ton entering 2008 was only 30 euros, and by 2009,
it had dropped to less than 10 euros (Bond 2012, 42, 25). By 2017, the price of carbon
reached an all-time low of 4.40 euros, and though the market has rebounded in the past
year, the price of carbon has never been high enough to truly incentivize a reduction in
emissions (Cuff 2018). Carbon markets haven’t fared any better in the United States,
where in 2010, the Chicago market was forced to close entirely due to market failure
(Bond 2012, 36). The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a more recent marketoriented solution implemented in the northeast United States, has been successful at
reducing greenhouse gases on a smaller scale, but has done so through mandatory
prescription to RGGI policies for member states and has not been effective in initiating a
nationwide drive for emission reduction (RGGI 2018).
The allure of the carbon market came with its potential as the next bubble- a
multi-trillion dollar market bursting onto the scene. Before the 2009 Copenhagen COP, it
was estimated that the carbon market would produce $3 trillion in trade and potentially
trillions more in the derivatives business by 2020 (Bond 2012, 72). Thus, carbon markets
are most appealing to those who stand to benefit from investing, namely stakeholders in
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firms that manage carbon exchange. Journalist Matt Taibbi published an article just prior
to the Copenhagen COP entitled “The Great American Bubble Machine” that pointed to
the influence of financial goliath Goldman Sachs in creating lucrative markets through
political and economic manipulation. In 2009, the bank spent 3.5 million dollars in
climate change lobbying in order to implement a carbon trading market in the United
States. A further 4.45 million dollars was given to Democratic campaigns in the previous
election cycle. These contributions make sense in light of the fact that Goldman Sachs
owned a ten percent stake in the doomed Chicago Climate Exchange. By Taibbi’s
assessment, Goldman Sachs effectively created a new market bubble in the same manner
that it created bubbles in housing, tech, and oil extending back to the Great Depression
(Taibbi 2010).
Though the UN has driven climate justice talks, other global governance
institutions have not remained behind the scenes. The World Bank has been one of the
most ardent supporters of carbon commodification, seeking neoliberal solutions to
climate change that have yet to come to fruition. Yet again, it appears that the World
Bank’s incentive is not to provide universal solutions, but rather to maintain the Western
order from which the institution was conceived. This is indicated through the Bank’s
actions and policies, but has also come to the surface explicitly in several instances. One
of the more infamous examples was the memo signed by then World Bank chief
economist Larry Summers in 1991, which read: “‘the economic logic behind dumping a
load of toxic waste on the lowest-wage country is impeccable and we should face up to
that… African countries are vastly underpolluted’” (Bond 2012, 55). Such irrational and
harmful intent is superficially discouraging, but also lends insights into the economic
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policy that serves as a vehicle for unsavory motives. Bond identifies the neoliberal
response to climate change as one that seeks to “shift,” “stall,” and “steal” rather than
substantively address excess carbon emissions (Bond 2012, 55-56). Carbon markets
allow for the shifting of responsibility for carbon reduction from the Global North to the
Global South, enabling the United States and other powerful nations to perpetuate their
hegemony into the realm of climate change (Bond 2012, 74). Increased emissions
reduction responsibility in turn depresses industrialization and furthers the disparity
between wealthy and poor nations. Ultimately, if climate change solutions are oriented
toward market mechanisms, the largest emitters can continue to exert disproportionate
power through the channels established by neocolonial trade relationships.
Market mechanisms are not the only reason for a global failure to address climate
change. US intransigence has played a major role in delaying adequate solutions, both
domestically as the globe’s second top emitter and internationally as a major player in
climate change discussions. The country that has been most responsible for shaping the
post-WWII international scene is not only one of the world’s top two emitters, it has
made explicit efforts to remove itself from climate change resolution negotiations.
Trump’s recent departure from the Paris Agreements compounds an already miserable
track record of noncompliance with international climate mitigation efforts. The Bush
administration was the first to hijack progress toward climate resolution by removing the
United States from binding elements of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 (Kahn 551, 2003).
Over the next few years, Washington began pushing for climate agreements that were
“pledge and review” oriented rather than binding, which they then presented at the 2009
COP in Copenhagen (Bond 2012, 6). Shortly thereafter, a GOP surge in the 2010
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midterm elections brought an unprecedented amount of climate denialists into office,
further stymieing motion toward effective climate solutions.
The fossil fuel industry has played a major role in financing candidates with
positions conducive to their aims, spending over 50 million dollars in lobbying expenses
every year since 1998. Fossil fuel lobbying in the United States peaked in 2009 at an
astonishing 175.4 million dollars, the same year Washington pushed for relaxed carbon
reduction commitments in Copenhagen. The fossil fuel industry has spent over 100
million dollars in lobbying annually since 2008, with 2018 coming in at 124.5 million
dollars (Center for Responsive Politics 2018). The fossil fuel industry cannot be blamed
entirely for climate solution stagnation, but it has certainly oiled the machinery utilized
by the United States to maintain control over a climate discussions.
The United States already uses bullying tactics on an international level to reduce
carbon regulation and enable the continued use of free and unrestricted markets. Even
more suspicious are the tactics that have been undertaken behind the scenes to silence
climate demands. The most notable instance, besides perhaps the millions of aid dollars
retracted from Bolivia and Ecuador following the 2009 COP, is the overt manipulation
the United States exerted upon the Maldives, an island nation highly susceptible to
climate change. Before Copenhagen, the Maldives emerged as a champion of the Global
South’s efforts to curb Global North emissions by holding an underwater cabinet meeting
with officials bedecked in scuba gear to signal the immediacy of the climate crisis for
island nations. Sensing a threat, United States officials contacted the Maldives US
ambassador indicating that “tangible assistance” would be given to the country if they
were to realize the “advantages to be gained by compliance” with US climate policy
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(Bond 2012, 91). These were not just words- US deputy climate change envoy Jonathan
Pershing arranged a 50 million dollar aid package to be sent to the Maldives in exchange
for their cooperation at the upcoming COP (Bond 2012, 91). Such an explicit attempt at
climate solution subterfuge lays barren the US position on climate change and reinforces
the North-South duality that the United States has so carefully constructed and
maintained.

Bolivia’s Climate Justice
Bolivia has articulated a version of climate justice that, perhaps more than any
other, has resonated throughout the Global South. Bond identifies the Bolivian
government-sponsored People’s World Conference on the Climate Change and the Rights
of Mother Earth as the most “portentous” political event that has yet contributed to the
climate justice movement (Bond 2012, 187). He goes on to say that the conference served
as a “confirmation of a climate justice identity,” where representatives from 140
countries came together to acknowledge a pressing and ever-growing issue (Bond 2012,
187). Though the second World People’s Conference was less publicized than the first,
Bolivia’s continued push for climate justice in the face of politically orchestrated climate
stagnation is a testament to Bolivia’s leadership in the climate justice movement. Further,
Bolivia’s seventeenth constitution since its founding has championed the rights of the
indigenous population for the first time since colonization ensued, and has enshrined the
rights of Mother Earth along with commitments to strive toward decolonization and seek
equality and complementarity amongst people. These factors present a monumental
global precedent, and have established Bolivia’s administration as one of the most
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progressive in the world in regards to climate change resistance. Further, Evo’s
admonition of a global capitalist system and the institutions and countries that perpetuate
colonial interactions has provided a rallying point around which the Global South and
allies in the Global North have coalesced. Sentiments such as the following have defined
the external view of the Morales administration:
As long as we do not change the capitalist system for a system based on
complementarity, solidarity, and harmony among peoples and nature, the
measures we adopt will be palliatives that will have a limited and precarious
character. For us, what has failed is the model of “living better” [vivir mejor], of
unlimited development, of industrialization without borders, of modernity that
disregards history, of increasing accumulation of goods at the expense of others
and nature. That is why we propose the idea of “living well” [Vivir Bien], in
harmony with other human beings and with our Mother Earth. (Hindery and
Hecht, 2013).
“Vivir bien” has become a rallying cry in Bolivia under the Morales administration, as it
encapsulates a worldview that rebukes colonialism, affirms indigenous practices, and
focuses on non-market mechanisms by which to maintain equality and live fully. It does
not, however, align with the extractive practices with which Bolivia has continued to
engage.
Under the Morales administration, Bolivia has increased dependence on natural
resources, but has nationalized extractive industries to promote social welfare amongst its
people, as we saw in Chapter 3. Not only have poverty rates been alleviated and GDP
accelerated, the gap that exists between the white/mestizo elite and indigenous people has
been lessened both in economic and political terms. Bolivia’s efforts toward climate
justice are nevertheless paradoxical. At its foundation, climate justice expresses a dire
need to reduce carbon emissions and ameliorate the threat posed by climate change.
Though Evo has perpetuated extractive practices, he has simultaneously reduced climate
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vulnerability in Bolivia by buttressing the most vulnerable populations and providing a
platform upon which previously silenced voices may express their needs and concerns. It
is here that the following Kohl and Farthing’s sentiments are most applicable: “even a
president of good-will cannot fix twenty years of neoliberal policies overlaid on 500
years of social exclusion” (2006, 2). For a country situated as Bolivia is, extractive
practices and climate justice need not be mutually exclusive.
There is no question that investment in fossil fuels and the pursuit of development
projects that seek to open pathways for further resource exploitation do not align with any
of the previously mentioned iterations of climate justice. The climate justice lineage has
sought to free the world from fossil fuel dependence and find alternative mechanisms by
which to live. However, climate justice has simultaneously issued an imperative to
support and protect the most climate vulnerable populations, which, in most cases, are
those that have been extensively colonized and stripped of the means to absorb drastic
changes in the climate. Not only has the Morales administration recognized extreme
disparities and vulnerabilities, it has acted to ensure that foreign interests no longer
determine who will receive the short end of the stick during the coming years and
decades. Further, Evo has contributed to the lineage of climate justice in distinct and
impactful ways, and has brought attention to a world order dictated by powerful nations
and the trappings of neocolonialism. In many ways, Bolivia has manifested and expressed
climate justice in the only way possible given the constraints the nation has faced for
centuries.
This is not to excuse ecologically damaging practices, nor to condone behaviors
exhibited by the Morales administration that have proven to favor growth and economic
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gain over humanity. Rather, I mean to bring attention to the systems with which Bolivia
is engaged and the heavily weighted power dynamics that have disadvantaged the country
for years. I have developed a narrative that situates Bolivia within a Western order that
has distinctly favored the will of the hemispheric hegemon, the United States. The global
governance institutions and the ideologies they serve have perpetuated global processes
that favor US interests. Such interests have been protected through force, austerity
measures, political manipulation, and capitalization upon colonial trading pathways. It is
no coincidence that Bolivia has some of the largest resource wealth in South America and
yet is the poorest country on the continent. Likewise, that Bolivia’s population is majority
indigenous is strongly correlated with the country’s historic impoverishment. These
factors make Bolivia a primary target for resource exploitation on the backs of
indigenous people, and Western powers have taken advantage of such positionality for
centuries. By targeting the most marginalized people sitting atop a wealth of fossil fuel
and mineral resources, the West has established Bolivia as resource trough for their
exploitation.
Another point that I find crucial to this discussion is the perception of Bolivia and
other such countries by the Global North, and particularly by the United States. Efforts to
quell leftist movements throughout the 20th century indicate explicit attempts to contain
anti-imperial movements, but the subliminal messaging that has led to negative
perceptions of Latin American countries has been perhaps equally as damaging.
Criticisms of the Morales government in the face of unprecedented social and economic
growth serve the aims of the United States and other Western powers. By placing blame
on the Bolivian government for internal issues rather than acknowledging a historic
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pattern of foreign exploitation, the US can effectively deflect responsibility and
perpetuate unbalanced power dynamics. This is not to say that critiques of the Morales
government are not warranted, but rather that criminalizing Evo for his extractive
practices without an analysis of the broader systems with which Bolivia is entangled
shifts attention away from historic dependencies that Bolivia is still struggling to
disengage from. Further, to assume that dependence on extractive industries negates
efforts toward climate justice is to ignore the role Bolivia has played in advancing climate
justice as a movement, particularly in the Global South. Bond writes that the World
People’s Conference hosted by Evo “set in motion a much more serious transnational
climate justice approach, based not on the illusion that the UN will address the climate
crisis anytime soon, but instead on more serious, pragmatic strategies” (2012, 203). These
strategies have yet to reduce global carbon emissions, but they have provided a climate
buffer for Bolivian residents through the fortification of social support systems.
Bolivia thus presents a form of climate justice that relies on progressive
extractivism as a basic framework. This is atypical and seemingly contradictory, but it is
not a model derived from the will of the Bolivian people or government. Rather, it is a
means by which to address apparent global inequalities while simultaneously combating
the negative effects of climate change. As we saw in Chapter 2, Bolivia has long been
subject to resource exploitation that has developed into a primary industry, an industry
that now plays an important role in funding social projects within Bolivia. The climate
justice movement and the global justice activism that preceded it have fought for the
rights of Global South countries to engage in development, a process that has been
repressed by the Global North in order to maintain dependencies that facilitate resource
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extraction and political control (See Chapter 3). This is not to say that climate justice
advocates for increased consumption and industrialization across the globe, but rather
that colonial legacies create vulnerabilities that can only be alleviated through the
fracturing of dependencies. Bolivia has begun hacking away at the ties that bind them to
the United States, nationalizing industry and forcing US representatives from the table.
Though the United States remains one of Bolivia’s largest trading partners, we have seen
that Bolivia has diversified its export economy and has elevated living standards for its
populous while doing so. To suggest that Bolivia needs to cut ties with extractive
industries if it wishes to advance the climate justice agenda is to unjustly place blame
upon a nation that has fortified its society in the only way possible given historic
economic constraints.
This thesis is not meant to be a holistic indictment of capitalism, and I have not
shown that capitalism and the economic philosophies that undergird the system are
universally detrimental. Rather, I have shown that economic policies based in
neoliberalism have been used to continually advantage the Global North over the Global
South, using Bolivia as a pertinent case study. More importantly, capitalistic policies
have accentuated global discrepancies and entrenched colonial imbalances in favor of
historically dominant powers. Canadian political philosopher C.B MacPherson makes a
key observation in his analysis of historic employments of liberal markets. He notes that
all liberal democracies that have implemented market economies have done so before all
citizens within the country enjoyed equal rights before the law (Hellinger 2015, 24). In
doing so, these countries have inherently advantaged those that were privileged prior to
the implementation of a market economy, the United States being a primary example.
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Capitalism has been used as a mechanism by which to cement hierarchical power
balances and increase discrepancies between the wealthy and the poor. This analysis
applies to international processes as well, and generally features the suppression of
subaltern peoples in the name of economic growth on behalf of the Global North.
Renowned colonial historian Ania Loomba writes in her groundbreaking work
Colonialism/Postcolonialism that colonialism can be defined as “the conquest and control
of other people’s lands and goods” (2005, 8). However, she notes that given this
definition, no form of colonialism prior to European conquest managed to alter the entire
globe as profoundly as modern colonialism. Loomba attributes the widespread,
penetrating nature of modern colonialism to the establishment of capitalism alongside
Western conquest. She writes that capitalism when paired with colonial enterprise
“produced the economic imbalance that was necessary for the growth of capitalism
industry,” arguing that “colonialism was the midwife that assisted at the birth of
European capitalism, or that without colonial expansion the transition to capitalism could
not have taken place in Europe” (Loomba 2005, 9-10). Today, “unequal relations of
colonial rule are reinscribed in the contemporary imbalances between ‘first’ and ‘third’
world nations,” with liberal market mechanisms facilitating the maintenance of power
disparities (Loomba 2005, 12). Bolivians have recognized this for some time, and have
long been fomenting resistance to persistent neocolonial relationships and the
accompanying economic systems that stand at such odds with Bolivian indigenous
values. The Morales administration has actualized indigenous defiance, and has acted to
extricate Bolivia from the clutches of neocolonialism by citing the primary objective of
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the new Plurinational State of Bolivia as decolonization and by speaking out against
global forces of oppression.

Barriers to Climate Justice in Bolivia
Like the rest of the world, Bolivia is facing impending climate changes that will
test the social fabric of society and wreak havoc on established ways of living. Unlike
much of the world, Bolivia has issued a doctrine that consists of imperatives driven by
the understanding that there are extreme global imbalances and that vulnerable
populations are most endangered by climate change. Evo has called for an end to colonial
power dynamics, and has unabashedly slammed international governance for ineffective
tactics that benefit the privileged. He has condemned a capitalist colonial mechanism of
global oppression, and through his organization of the World People’s Conference on
Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, openly rebuked the liberal market
ideations that have backed failed efforts at climate mitigation. At the same time, Evo has
engaged in extractive practices that have fueled Bolivia’s economy for centuries, and has
thusly contributed to the global crisis that stems from carbon emissions and
environmental degradation. Here lies the central paradox of this thesis: the Morales
administration has presented a clear stance against capitalism, colonialism, and
environmental damage, and yet continues to contribute to atmospheric carbon levels
using market mechanisms. What, then, are the barriers preventing Bolivia from fulfilling
its projected cosmology?
We may start with the criticisms leveraged against the Morales administration,
namely that Evo has used indigeneity performatively to capitalize upon the swell of
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indigenous activism that brought him and his party to power while continuing to engage
in neoliberal, extractive practices in the background. Canessa argues that Evo has
promoted a new nationalism based in indigeneity and resistance to globalization, and has
used that nationalism to advance his agenda (Canessa 2012, 204). Canessa does not imply
that Evo has surreptitiously drained the country of resources behind a facade of
indigenous advocacy, but rather that he has used his positionality to engender widespread
support. Others, such as Aymara leader Rafael Quispe, are more disparaging in their
criticism. Quispe called out Evo for continuing the very practices that he was elected to
defend against, and has denounced his used of indigeneity to capitalize on popular
support. Postero shares some of these critical views, pointing to the performative and
symbolic acts that Evo continually undertakes to reaffirm his indigenous background.
These acts include rituals at the ancient Tiwanaku ruins, rallies at sites of historic
oppression, and the invocation of indigenous revolutionaries such as Tupac Katari.
Postero identifies these acts as affirming “potent fictions” that serve to “draw the public
into a redemptive narrative” in order to fortify the the lineage of indigenous protest that
led to Evo’s election (2017, 37). Further, the redemptive narrative provides a veil behind
which the Morales administration can pursue extractive objectives without public
scrutiny.
Fernando Garcia nuances the criticism of Morales by speaking to the way that
Evo uses rhetoric to distort public perceptions of capitalism. By essentializing capitalism
to a tool of oppressors and a force of injustice, he effectively vilifies the economic world
order while distracting from the market mechanisms used to extract and export natural
resources (Garcia Pers. Comm. 2018). Through the contrasting of Bolivia with the
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Western order on an international stage and the maintenance of an atmosphere of change
in Bolivia, Evo has retained indigenous support while simultaneously enacting
counterintuitive economic policies in regards to extraction. Only in instances such as
TIPNIS are the underlying neoliberal motives of the Morales administration revealed.
Thus, critics of Evo postulate that Morales simply took advantage of a revolutionary
context to propel himself to power, and has since sustained Bolivia through the same
means that previous administrations assumed. While there is some evidence behind this
theory, I find more holes than supports. Evo may have capitalized upon the momentum
initiated through activism in response to neoliberal policies, but, as I have shown in
Chapter 3, he has made substantive changes in Bolivia that have advanced the aims of
climate justice, reduced poverty and wealth disparities, and institutionalized freedoms for
indigenous people that have not been enjoyed for centuries. Deception has at times
played a role in Evo’s practices, but he has been vocal about the economic inequalities
perpetuated by unequal power dynamics between the Global North and Global South, and
has recognized the dependencies created through the workings of colonialism.
Handcuffed by an economy reliant upon extraction for the benefit of foreign entities, Evo
has pushed to advance the aims of climate justice through redistributive economics and
institutional changes that have resonated throughout the Global South. The barriers
Bolivia faces in pursuing climate justice are thus not attributable to domestic malpractice,
but rather arise from systemic imbalances created and perpetuated by the Western order.
The Western order, led by the hegemonic US, has developed a global marketplace
that rests on a foundation of colonialism. The lineage of US interactions with Latin
America fortifies this conception, with clear trends toward commodification of resources
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over human rights. In Chapter 2, we saw the colonial legacy in Bolivia created a co-opted
indigenous organizational structure that was then used as a resource extraction machine
that operated upon indigenous labor. The resultant formation of criollo and mestizo
economic centers nurtured class disparities within Bolivia, which were then accentuated
upon independence. Indigenous protests have been a consistent theme in Bolivian history,
but they have been continually repressed by those that wish to benefit from their lands
and resources. Throughout a national history defined by military uprisings and social
unrest, the United States has capitalized on Bolivia’s coerced adherence to international
trade practices, and has made efforts to disrupt attempts at fracturing a parasitic
dependency. These efforts have come in the form of direct military intervention,
promotion of regional development plans, austerity measures, and economic punishments
for deviating from the US policy agenda. Now, with Bolivia situated in the most powerful
position it has enjoyed for centuries, demands for justice reverberate more strongly and
are met with more resistance.
Climate change solutions threaten the United States’ ability to exert international
influence and continue reliance upon fossil fuels as a primary industry. Today, despite
dire warnings from the scientific community, the United States gets 81 percent of its
energy through oil, coal, and natural gas (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine 2019). In 2017, US oil demands constituted 19 percent of global domestic
oil demand despite the country containing only 5 percent of the world’s population, and
calculations place US energy consumption at 17 percent of the world’s total (Center for
Sustainable Systems 2018). That same year, a study by IBISWorld determined that oil
and gas revenues globally reached 2 trillion dollars annually, accounting for between 2
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and 3 percent of the global economy (IBISWorld 2017). The United States does not only
utilize the fossil fuel industry for energy sourcing, but also as a means by which to
operate and maintain a world order that has centered around US inspired market ideals.
Fossil fuel interests dictate US foreign policy in many instances, and have been at the
core of several modern international disputes. Climate change mitigation efforts pose a
direct threat to the existence of one of the world’s biggest markets, and the world’s
largest contributor to that market has made every effort to ensure that climate policy will
not snatch away the reins.
If climate mitigation is an inconvenience to the Western order, then climate
justice is an all out assault on Western norms and practices, particularly when it emanates
from the Global South. Evo has made it clear that Western economic policies and
neocolonial practices are antithetical to Bolivian ways of life, and has demanded that
Bolivia be freed from toxic relationships with its colonizers. Such demands have been
repressed in Latin America throughout the 20th century, but Evo has announced that he
will not bend to the will of the United States or other foreign interests regardless of the
punishments that have been leveraged against him for his actions. The climate justice
movement goes further than suggesting that high emitting countries change their
practices; it has demanded that those countries pay reparations for the harm they have
caused and move forward in a way that centralizes oppressed and vulnerable groups, and
Bolivia is leading the charge. The United States and other powers of the Global North
have long benefited from the discrepancies that exist between them and formerly
colonized nations and have acted to ensure that such discrepancies remain in place.
Demands oriented around climate justice push back against the systems that maintain
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poverty and dependency in the Global South, and in doing so, begin to tear away at
imperial hegemonic structures.
The expression of climate justice has been systematically inhibited by a Western
order that remains fixated on fossil fuels and capitalistic practices. The United States has
spearheaded repression efforts against the southern nations in the Western hemisphere
and continues to control climate discussions through punitive economic measures and
obstinate negotiation tactics fueled by business interests. The global governance
institutions that were borne of hegemonic ambitions and capitalistic ideations continue to
fund projects antithetical to climate justice efforts, and while Bolivia has sought to
remove itself from the structural vices imposed by such institutions, they remain strapped
by development imperatives maintained by the Western order. Even now, despite
acknowledgements that Bolivia has made tremendous strides under Evo’s social
redistributive economic system, the World Bank has stated that it is “important to join
forces with the private sector to continue developing the country’s potential in the energy
sector” (World Bank: Overview 2018). Such intent does not reflect a change in ideology
in accordance with Bolivia’s efforts, which reinforces the notion that the Western order
will continue to push forth using mechanisms that have historically damaged the earth
and the people that reside upon it.
Not only have the demands arising from both the World People’s Conferences
fallen on deaf ears, the organizers of the conferences that the United States viewed as
subversive were directly punished through funding retractions. US intransigence
continues to stymie work toward climate change resolution, as evidenced by lack of
cooperation with the international community and the manipulation of climate talks to
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prevent binding emissions reduction commitments and the repayment of climate debts.
This is further shown by the rejection of climate demands made by the Global South and
the failure of COPs to acknowledge climate justice initiatives. Historical inequality is
amplified in the face of climate change, which is a process that we have seen exposes
vulnerabilities and exacerbates discrepancies between the wealthy and the poor. Those
inequalities fall along the lines of colonial domination and continue to advantage those
that have benefitted from the consumptive practices that have led to the climate crisis.
Evo Morales has given a voice to an historically marginalized group of people that are
now using that platform to demand reparations for past and current injustices perpetrated
upon them by a neocolonial market system facilitated by neoliberal ideology. These
demands are not a simple tit for tat- they are pleas for assurance that the future will not be
one such as that painted by Christopher Parenti, with the wealthiest countries defending
their resources as the rest of the world scrambles for basic necessities. Bolivia is highly
vulnerable to climate change, and as such, the demands issuing from the country are
becoming ever more desperate.
Bolivia presents an ideal case study through which to understand global climate
processes. As the poorest nation in South America with a long history of extractive
colonialism, Bolivia exemplifies the pernicious effects of colonialism and resultant
economic structures. Further, the geographical setting of Bolivia provides a model by
which to analyze climate processes, displaying in a small region a wide array of
ecological settings that will be impacted separately and as a part of a larger climate
system. Most portentously, Bolivia’s newest administration has provided representation
for an indigenous majority that has not enjoyed political relevance in centuries, and the
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Morales administration has used that platform to initiate reforms that seek to break the
cycles of neocolonialism and initiate a global movement toward climate justice. In doing
so, Evo has brought to attention the wrongs perpetrated on the Global South by the
Global North, and has condemned the use of “free markets” as a proxy for
neocolonialism. He has further demanded that such wrongs be repaid, and has argued that
the Global South is not responsible for ongoing environmental degradation, but that
demands from former colonial powers necessitate reliance on destructive industries
across the globe. Bolivia’s prominence in the climate justice movement speaks volumes
to the country’s ability to initiate change despite suffering from extreme historical
impoverishment. However, that the primary aims of the World People’s agreement were
not achieved signals that Bolivia is not in a position to overtake global climate
discussions, nor are the 140 countries that sent delegates to the Conference. Subaltern
voices are categorically rejected in climate discussions due to the threats they pose to
Global North industry and consumption. As Bolivian representative Pablo Solon stated in
a press release following COP16 in Cancun, “proposals by powerful countries like the US
were sacrosanct, while ours were disposable. Compromise was always at the expense of
the victims, rather than the culprits of climate change” (Buxton 2010). Bolivia has broken
through the barrier laid by Western institutions by erupting onto the global stage as a
champion of climate justice, but the degree to which Bolivia and other similarly situated
countries have the ability to initiate global change is severely limited by the actions of
global powers such as the United States.
I argue that Bolivia exemplifies the impossibility of climate justice fulfillment
within the context of the Western order. With negligible voting power in international
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institutions and an economy riddled with dependencies despite movement toward
nationalization, Bolivia has little sway in matters of global reform. Domestic activism,
particularly by indigenous people, has combated Bolivia’s systemic disenfranchisement
for centuries, but only under the Morales administration has that activism had the
opportunity to spill over into the international realm. While the fight for domestic
stability and economic fortification is not over in Bolivia, the employment of Evo’s social
projects has propelled Bolivia to a relative position of power from which it can project
messaging antagonistic to Western economic practices. Despite these strides, Bolivia,
along with the rest of the Global South, remains at the whim of the world’s largest
emitters. Carbon emissions continue to rise as the scientific community, led by the IPCC,
projects drastic climate futures that will disproportionately affect the most vulnerable
populations. Due to economic insulation, the world’s largest emitters also happen to be
the least vulnerable to the climate changes they cause, providing a counter-incentive for
emissions reduction. Meanwhile, formerly colonized nations struggle to gain a foothold
in terms of economic and social relevance on the global stage, entangled in domestic
issues arising from neocolonial pressures that prevent larger scale climate resistance.
Evo Morales’s prominence in the climate justice movement is precisely because
the civil society uprisings that bore him to the presidency had sights on global reform that
would break the chains of dependency that have long repressed Bolivia. They
incriminated the neoliberal practices that were imposed upon Bolivia by foreign powers
and sought international action that would alleviate domestic issues caused by
intervention. Evo has made good on his promises to elevate Bolivia from colonialinduced poverty, and in doing so, has reduced climate vulnerability in Bolivia and
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progressed the aims of climate justice on an international level. The ability of indigenous
activists to implement a representative government despite centuries of marginalization
has initiated a power transfer that features resistance to the processes that have kept
Bolivia from achieving justice. This is a unique situation, particularly given Bolivia’s
impoverished status relative to other South American nations and the country’s high
percentage of indigenous residents.
While Bolivia’s achievements are impressive, they have not induced the
momentous change needed to protect the globe’s most vulnerable and reverse the effects
of climate change. Indeed, no one country could effectuate such a change, particularly if
they are situated similarly to Bolivia. Bolivia’s continued dependence on extractive
industries exemplifies this point. Without the economic means to both support its
citizenry and detach from environmentally damaging industries, resource wealthy
countries with a history of colonialism have no choice but to continue extracting
resources for the benefit of wealthier nations. Bolivia may have emerged from adverse
conditions with policies aligned with climate justice principles, but that does not imply
that the nation has overcome centuries of economic and social oppression. This case
study indicates that the barriers to climate justice are incredibly high, and that the
attainment of climate justice ideals will not be possible within the framework set by the
Western order. With Trump at the helm, climate denialism continues to course through
the veins of US institutions and policies even as hundreds of thousands of climate
casualties pile up in vulnerable countries. It is essential that voices demanding climate
justice be heard in an era of anthropogenic climate change that threatens the livelihood of
humanity, starting at the lowest economic rung. Bolivia has made incredible strides
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toward climate justice by reducing internal vulnerability and projecting indigenousdriven climate demands, but the forces of repression must be challenged more forcefully
if justice is to be attained. As Evo Morales declared to a global audience at COP16:
“It’s easy for people in an air-conditioned room to continue with the policies of
destruction of Mother Earth. We need instead to put ourselves in the shoes of
families in Bolivia and worldwide that lack water and food and suffer misery and
hunger. People here in Cancun have no idea what it is like to be a victim of
climate change” -Evo Morales (Bond 2012, 7-8)
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Conclusion
I have endeavored to show through literary, political, and economic analysis that
Bolivia faces barriers to climate justice that have arisen from a colonial history of
extractivism and ensuing international configurations that favor the ambitions of global
hegemons such as the United States. The narrative I have developed situates the current
Bolivian administration within historic and global contexts that have featured power
imbalances disadvantaging Bolivia relative to the Global North and inhibiting the
expression of indigenous-driven demands for justice. Civil society uprisings in response
to detrimental neoliberal policies imposed by global governance institutions bore Evo
Morales to the presidency, and he has since used that platform to amplify indigenousdriven messaging that calls for justice in an era of anthropogenic climate change. The
activism that brought Evo to prominence did not merely seek an end to the neoliberal
reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, but also sought to disrupt a lineage of oppression derived
from colonial enterprise that has since manifested in the marginalization of indigenous
people and large wealth discrepancies between the Global North and Global South.
Morales has made good on his promises to nationalize Bolivia’s industries and elevate
the social welfare of Bolivian citizens through a system of progressive extractivism, and
in doing so, has reduced domestic climate vulnerability through social reinforcement. His
reforms have been particularly impactful for historically impoverished indigenous
groups, as his redistribution policies have greatly reduced income inequality and extreme
poverty.
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Operating within the confines of an historically extractive nation, the Morales
administration has utilized the only mechanism available to elevate its people out of
poverty and acute climate vulnerability. By nationalizing extractive industries and
utilizing surplus government funds, Evo has implemented a broad range of social policies
that have leveled the playing field within Bolivia while simultaneously propelling the
country to a position of international relevance in global negotiations. Through the
mitigation of domestic inequality, Evo has increased Bolivia’s climate resilience capacity
and advanced the aims of climate justice, which seek to reduce climate vulnerability
based in inequality. On an international scale, Bolivia has been at the forefront of the
climate justice charge, vocalizing formerly suppressed ideations that challenge the
mechanisms of power in climate discussions and international relations. Ultimately,
Bolivia has fractured parasitic dependencies rooted in neocolonialism and has utilized its
recent economic independence to lead the fight for climate justice.
Bolivia represents a didactic case study through which climate change politics
can be interrogated. As a country highly vulnerable to climate change, Bolivia is calling
for climate solutions to happen with immediacy and equity. If such solutions are not
implemented, Bolivia will undoubtedly face disproportionate climate impacts due to their
precarious environmental setting and lack of insulating wealth. This is not only true of
Bolivia, but of many countries in the Global South that do not have the means by which
to defend against climate change. Bolivia represents a member state of the Global South
that has extricated itself from the Western order, and has used that positionality to attack
the systems of oppression maintained by global governance institutions and powerful
nations in the Global North. As Pablo Solon pointed out, there are many nations that
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remain beholden to the Western order and its institutions, a circumstance that will only
lead to disproportionate climate change impacts. Bolivia is attempting to initiate major
structural changes in the balance of global power in order to protect the world’s most
vulnerable citizens, but the constraints placed upon such a movement are massive in
scope.
In Chapter 1, I provided context for Bolivia’s contemporary administration and
introduced key themes of neoliberalism, indigeneity, climate justice, and climate
vulnerability. I showed that indigenous worldviews championed by Evo are antithetical to
the Western economic paradigm, and established Bolivia as a protagonist in the climate
justice movement. I also provided a nuanced overview of the more recent political events
that led to Evo’s election, underscoring the vitriolic relationship between Bolivia and
global governance institutions that has since led to Bolivia’s economic independence.
Additionally, I spoke to the ways in which economic and social inequality exacerbate
vulnerability, and pointed to vulnerability as a human construction overlaid by
environmental factors. This allowed me to uncover in later chapters the extent to which
Evo has advanced the aims of climate justice by reducing vulnerability through social
redistribution.
I then provided a history of Bolivia in Chapter 2 that illuminated the colonial
mechanisms of extraction and oppression that have left residual scars in Bolivia’s society.
By examining a lineage of indigenous resistance to colonial powers, I emphasized the
deeply entrenched tensions between colonial and indigenous ideologies that have led to a
tumultuous past. Further, in conveying the historic relationship between Bolivia and
colonial powers, I showed just how momentous Evo’s election was in providing the first
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adequate indigenous representation for over 500 years. I then provided an overview of
climatic factors affecting Bolivia in order to show the precarious nature of Bolivia’s
ecosystems and the degree to which climate change will affect Bolivian people.
In Chapter 3, I built upon work in previous chapters by diving into international
politics, using context from Chapters 1 and 2 to situate Bolivia within a world order that
has prominently featured US hegemony. By exhibiting the relationship between the US,
Bolivia, and international governance, I was able to show the repressive mechanisms
historically used to prevent Bolivia from attaining economic independence. An analysis
of Bolivia’s industries and policies under Morales then showed Bolivia’s continued
dependencies alongside the incredible strides in social welfare since Evo assumed office.
I investigated the controversial TIPNIS project in order to uncover the remnants of
neocolonial structures that continue to influence Bolivia’s development trajectory, and
then spoke to the ways in which Evo has effectively reduced climate vulnerability in
Bolivia.
Finally, I used Chapter 4 to elaborate upon global climate processes and connect
climate change politics to the international interactions I had previously investigated. By
bringing together the arguments I built in previous chapters, I showed that Bolivia faces
barriers to the pursuit of climate justice that have been erected by a global economic
system that has perpetuated inequality derived from colonial structures. I note Bolivia’s
international climate justice advocacy, and point to the ways in which Bolivia has
attempted to initiate justice-based climate reforms. US intransigence in climate
discussions is highlighted and connected to broader systems of power that continue to
benefit the wealthy at the expense of the poor. In the end, I show that Bolivia is an
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exemplary case study through which to understand global climate change dynamics, and
indicate that Bolivia exhibits the impossibility of climate justice within the current global
framework.
I would like to address the challenges I faced in writing this thesis along with a
discussion of my barriers to access and the implications of my positionality. I am a white
male with no language outside of English, which inherently reduces my legitimacy and
ability to speak on behalf of Bolivian residents, especially those of marginalized
identities. Rather than seeking to circumvent this obstacle, which could have resulted in
damaging misrepresentations of Bolivian people, I have attempted to approach the topic
within a framework that highlights my experiences and academic learning while drawing
from resources that, to the best of my knowledge, accurately reflect the views of Bolivian
officials and residents alike. I do not intend to speak on behalf of Bolivian people, nor do
I presume myself to be a representative of any Bolivian communities that I have
referenced in this work. Instead, my intentions have been to illuminate Bolivia’s position
relative to a world order that I have been able to analyze through economic and political
examination in order to appreciate the role Bolivia has played, and continues to play, in
the climate justice movement. I have used sources that have been recommended or
provided to me by Bolivian academics that I have been connected with through the
School of International Training, and I have interviewed Bolivian residents that have
played major roles in Bolivian social movements to gain a better perspective on Bolivian
politics. Though language does present a barrier to accessing work produced by Latin
American academics, I have effectively utilized online translation platforms to interpret
relevant resources. Further, by positioning Bolivia within an international context, I have
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been able to delve into literature produced by English-speaking authors that has
adequately supplemented my research.
My research does not represent a fully comprehensive review of Bolivian climate
justice, and there is ample opportunity for further investigation. Future work could speak
to several facets of Bolivian politics and climate justice efforts that I did not discuss.
Included amongst these topics could be Evo’s recent moves to maintain leadership
despite the expiration of his term limits. I do not interrogate these efforts as my focus is
not on the democratic processes within Bolivia, but internal legal struggles regarding
Evo’s tenure could impact his ability to enact climate justice reforms or continue the
swell of indigenous-oriented policy measures. Additionally, there is work to be done in
investigating the positions of other countries in the Global South that have been similarly
impacted by the machinations of neocolonialism. Further, a more in-depth analysis of
impending climate changes in Bolivia could better uncover the populations and industries
that will be most impacted in the coming years. Finally, a thorough analysis of Global
South or subaltern grassroots movements opposing the Western order and its institutions
could provide a foundation for solidarity and coalition building amongst global citizens.
Bolivia exemplifies a climate justice leader that has built upon centuries of
activism in the face of colonial enterprise to demand justice in a vastly unequal world.
The activism that led to Evo’s presidency continues to spill over into the international
realm, but it is contained by structures that have deeply embedded roots. Through my
work, it has become evident that the US-led Western order does not allow for the
realization of climate justice, and that global power imbalances maintained by
neocolonial mechanisms relegate poor countries to positions of climate vulnerability.
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Bolivia and the rest of the Global South are not responsible for anthropogenic climate
change, but they will be disproportionately impacted due to vulnerabilities constructed
and maintained by an unjust global economy. Pursuing climate justice is imperative if we
wish to protect the world’s most vulnerable populations, but those same populations do
not have the means to advocate for themselves, and thus are left by the wayside as top
emitters continue to push for environmentally degrading processes. Bolivia has proven to
be a committed advocate for climate justice, but their efforts must be amplified through
global solidarity if the aims of climate justice are to be met in time.
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Appendix I
Full text of the 2010 World People’s Agreement:
Today, our Mother Earth is wounded and the future of humanity is in danger.
If global warming increases by more than 2 degrees Celsius, a situation that the
“Copenhagen Accord” could lead to, there is a 50% probability that the damages caused
to our Mother Earth will be completely irreversible. Between 20% and 30% of species
would be in danger of disappearing. Large extensions of forest would be affected,
droughts and floods would affect different regions of the planet, deserts would expand,
and the melting of the polar ice caps and the glaciers in the Andes and Himalayas would
worsen. Many island states would disappear, and Africa would suffer an increase in
temperature of more than 3 degrees Celsius. Likewise, the production of food would
diminish in the world, causing catastrophic impact on the survival of inhabitants from
vast regions in the planet, and the number of people in the world suffering from hunger
would increase dramatically, a figure that already exceeds 1.02 billion people.The
corporations and governments of the so-called “developed” countries, in complicity with
a segment of the scientific community, have led us to discuss climate change as a
problem limited to the rise in temperature without questioning the cause, which is the
capitalist system.
We confront the terminal crisis of a civilizing model that is patriarchal and based on the
submission and destruction of human beings and nature that accelerated since the
industrial revolution.
The capitalist system has imposed on us a logic of competition, progress and limitless
growth. This regime of production and consumption seeks profit without limits,
separating human beings from nature and imposing a logic of domination upon nature,
transforming everything into commodities: water, earth, the human genome, ancestral
cultures, biodiversity, justice, ethics, the rights of peoples, and life itself.
Under capitalism, Mother Earth is converted into a source of raw materials, and human
beings into consumers and a means of production, into people that are seen as valuable
only for what they own, and not for what they are.
Capitalism requires a powerful military industry for its processes of accumulation and
imposition of control over territories and natural resources, suppressing the resistance of
the peoples. It is an imperialist system of colonization of the planet.
Humanity confronts a great dilemma: to continue on the path of capitalism, depredation,
and death, or to choose the path of harmony with nature and respect for life.
It is imperative that we forge a new system that restores harmony with nature and among
human beings. And in order for there to be balance with nature, there must first be equity
among human beings. We propose to the peoples of the world the recovery,
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revalorization, and strengthening of the knowledge, wisdom, and ancestral practices of
Indigenous Peoples, which are affirmed in the thought and practices of “Living Well,”
recognizing Mother Earth as a living being with which we have an indivisible,
interdependent, complementary and spiritual relationship. To face climate change, we
must recognize Mother Earth as the source of life and forge a new system based on the
principles of:
harmony and balance among all and with all things;
• complementarity, solidarity, and equality;
• collective well-being and the satisfaction of the basic necessities of all;
• people in harmony with nature;
• recognition of human beings for what they are, not what they own;
• elimination of all forms of colonialism, imperialism and interventionism;
• peace among the peoples and with Mother Earth;
The model we support is not a model of limitless and destructive development. All
countries need to produce the goods and services necessary to satisfy the fundamental
needs of their populations, but by no means can they continue to follow the path of
development that has led the richest countries to have an ecological footprint five times
bigger than what the planet is able to support. Currently, the regenerative capacity of the
planet has been already exceeded by more than 30 percent. If this pace of overexploitation of our Mother Earth continues, we will need two planets by the year
2030. In an interdependent system in which human beings are only one component, it is
not possible to recognize rights only to the human part without provoking an imbalance
in the system as a whole. To guarantee human rights and to restore harmony with nature,
it is necessary to effectively recognize and apply the rights of Mother Earth. For this
purpose, we propose the attached project for the Universal Declaration on the Rights of
Mother Earth, in which it’s recorded that:
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The right to live and to exist;
The right to be respected;
The right to regenerate its bio-capacity and to continue it’s vital cycles and
processes free of human alteration;
The right to maintain their identity and integrity as differentiated beings, selfregulated and interrelated;
The right to water as the source of life;
The right to clean air;
The right to comprehensive health;
The right to be free of contamination and pollution, free of toxic and radioactive
waste;
The right to be free of alterations or modifications of it’s genetic structure in a
manner that threatens it’s integrity or vital and healthy functioning;
The right to prompt and full restoration for violations to the rights acknowledged in
this Declaration caused by human activities.
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The “shared vision” seeks to stabilize the concentrations of greenhouse gases to make
effective the Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
which states that “the stabilization of greenhouse gases concentrations in the atmosphere
to a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic inferences for the climate system.” Our
vision is based on the principle of historical common but differentiated responsibilities, to
demand the developed countries to commit with quantifiable goals of emission reduction
that will allow to return the concentrations of greenhouse gases to 300 ppm, therefore the
increase in the average world temperature to a maximum of one degree Celsius.
Emphasizing the need for urgent action to achieve this vision, and with the support of
peoples, movements and countries, developed countries should commit to ambitious
targets for reducing emissions that permit the achievement of short-term objectives, while
maintaining our vision in favor of balance in the Earth’s climate system, in agreement
with the ultimate objective of the Convention.
The “shared vision for long-term cooperative action” in climate change negotiations
should not be reduced to defining the limit on temperature increases and the
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, but must also incorporate in a
balanced and integral manner measures regarding capacity building, production and
consumption patterns, and other essential factors such as the acknowledging of the Rights
of Mother Earth to establish harmony with nature.
Developed countries, as the main cause of climate change, in assuming their historical
responsibility, must recognize and honor their climate debt in all of its dimensions as the
basis for a just, effective, and scientific solution to climate change. In this context, we
demand that developed countries:
•
Restore to developing countries the atmospheric space that is occupied by their
greenhouse gas emissions. This implies the decolonization of the atmosphere through the
reduction and absorption of their emissions;
•
Assume the costs and technology transfer needs of developing countries arising
from the loss of development opportunities due to living in a restricted atmospheric
space;
•
Assume responsibility for the hundreds of millions of people that will be forced to
migrate due to the climate change caused by these countries, and eliminate their
restrictive immigration policies, offering migrants a decent life with full human rights
guarantees in their countries;
•
Assume adaptation debt related to the impacts of climate change on developing
countries by providing the means to prevent, minimize, and deal with damages arising
from their excessive emissions;
•
Honor these debts as part of a broader debt to Mother Earth by adopting and
implementing the United Nations Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth.
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The focus must not be only on financial compensation, but also on restorative justice,
understood as the restitution of integrity to our Mother Earth and all its beings.
We deplore attempts by countries to annul the Kyoto Protocol, which is the sole legally
binding instrument specific to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by developed
countries.
We inform the world that, despite their obligation to reduce emissions, developed
countries have increased their emissions by 11.2% in the period from 1990 to 2007.
During that same period, due to unbridled consumption, the United States of America has
increased its greenhouse gas emissions by 16.8%, reaching an average of 20 to 23 tons of
CO2 per-person. This represents 9 times more than that of the average inhabitant of the
“Third World,” and 20 times more than that of the average inhabitant of Sub-Saharan
Africa.
We categorically reject the illegitimate “Copenhagen Accord” that allows developed
countries to offer insufficient reductions in greenhouse gases based in voluntary and
individual commitments, violating the environmental integrity of Mother Earth and
leading us toward an increase in global temperatures of around 4°C.
The next Conference on Climate Change to be held at the end of 2010 in Mexico should
approve an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol for the second commitment period from
2013 to 2017 under which developed countries must agree to significant domestic
emissions reductions of at least 50% based on 1990 levels, excluding carbon markets or
other offset mechanisms that mask the failure of actual reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions.
We require first of all the establishment of a goal for the group of developed countries to
achieve the assignment of individual commitments for each developed country under the
framework of complementary efforts among each one, maintaining in this way Kyoto
Protocol as the route to emissions reductions.
The United States, as the only Annex 1 country on Earth that did not ratify the Kyoto
Protocol, has a significant responsibility toward all peoples of the world to ratify this
document and commit itself to respecting and complying with emissions reduction targets
on a scale appropriate to the total size of its economy.
We the peoples have the equal right to be protected from the adverse effects of climate
change and reject the notion of adaptation to climate change as understood as a
resignation to impacts provoked by the historical emissions of developed countries,
which themselves must adapt their modes of life and consumption in the face of this
global emergency. We see it as imperative to confront the adverse effects of climate
change, and consider adaptation to be a process rather than an imposition, as well as a
tool that can serve to help offset those effects, demonstrating that it is possible to achieve
harmony with nature under a different model for living.
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It is necessary to construct an Adaptation Fund exclusively for addressing climate change
as part of a financial mechanism that is managed in a sovereign, transparent, and
equitable manner for all States. This Fund should assess the impacts and costs of climate
change in developing countries and needs deriving from these impacts, and monitor
support on the part of developed countries. It should also include a mechanism for
compensation for current and future damages, loss of opportunities due to extreme and
gradual climactic events, and additional costs that could present themselves if our planet
surpasses ecological thresholds, such as those impacts that present obstacles to “Living
Well.”
The “Copenhagen Accord” imposed on developing countries by a few States, beyond
simply offering insufficient resources, attempts as well to divide and create confrontation
between peoples and to extort developing countries by placing conditions on access to
adaptation and mitigation resources. We also assert as unacceptable the attempt in
processes of international negotiation to classify developing countries for their
vulnerability to climate change, generating disputes, inequalities and segregation among
them.
The immense challenge humanity faces of stopping global warming and cooling the
planet can only be achieved through a profound shift in agricultural practices toward the
sustainable model of production used by indigenous and rural farming peoples, as well as
other ancestral models and practices that contribute to solving the problem of agriculture
and food sovereignty. This is understood as the right of peoples to control their own
seeds, lands, water, and food production, thereby guaranteeing, through forms of
production that are in harmony with Mother Earth and appropriate to local cultural
contexts, access to sufficient, varied and nutritious foods in complementarity with Mother
Earth and deepening the autonomous (participatory, communal and shared) production
of every nation and people.
Climate change is now producing profound impacts on agriculture and the ways of life of
indigenous peoples and farmers throughout the world, and these impacts will worsen in
the future.
Agribusiness, through its social, economic, and cultural model of global capitalist
production and its logic of producing food for the market and not to fulfill the right to
proper nutrition, is one of the principal causes of climate change. Its technological,
commercial, and political approach only serves to deepen the climate change crisis and
increase hunger in the world. For this reason, we reject Free Trade Agreements and
Association Agreements and all forms of the application of Intellectual Property Rights to
life, current technological packages (agrochemicals, genetic modification) and those that
offer false solutions (biofuels, geo-engineering, nanotechnology, etc.) that only
exacerbate the current crisis.
We similarly denounce the way in which the capitalist model imposes megainfrastructure projects and invades territories with extractive projects, water privatization,
and militarized territories, expelling indigenous peoples from their lands, inhibiting food
sovereignty and deepening socio-environmental crisis.
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We demand recognition of the right of all peoples, living beings, and Mother Earth to
have access to water, and we support the proposal of the Government of Bolivia to
recognize water as a Fundamental Human Right.
The definition of forests used in the negotiations of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, which includes plantations, is unacceptable.
Monoculture plantations are not forests. Therefore, we require a definition for negotiation
purposes that recognizes the native forests, jungles and the diverse ecosystems on Earth.
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples must be fully
recognized, implemented and integrated in climate change negotiations. The best strategy
and action to avoid deforestation and degradation and protect native forests and jungles is
to recognize and guarantee collective rights to lands and territories, especially
considering that most of the forests are located within the territories of indigenous
peoples and nations and other traditional communities.
We condemn market mechanisms such as REDD (Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation) and its versions + and + +, which are violating the
sovereignty of peoples and their right to prior free and informed consent as well as the
sovereignty of national States, the customs of Peoples, and the Rights of Nature.
Polluting countries have an obligation to carry out direct transfers of the economic and
technological resources needed to pay for the restoration and maintenance of forests in
favor of the peoples and indigenous ancestral organic structures. Compensation must be
direct and in addition to the sources of funding promised by developed countries outside
of the carbon market, and never serve as carbon offsets. We demand that countries stop
actions on local forests based on market mechanisms and propose non-existent and
conditional results. We call on governments to create a global program to restore native
forests and jungles, managed and administered by the peoples, implementing forest seeds,
fruit trees, and native flora. Governments should eliminate forest concessions and support
the conservation of petroleum deposits in the ground and urgently stop the exploitation of
hydrocarbons in forestlands.
We call upon States to recognize, respect and guarantee the effective implementation of
international human rights standards and the rights of indigenous peoples, including the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples under ILO Convention
169, among other relevant instruments in the negotiations, policies and measures used to
meet the challenges posed by climate change. In particular, we call upon States to give
legal recognition to claims over territories, lands and natural resources to enable and
strengthen our traditional ways of life and contribute effectively to solving climate
change.
We demand the full and effective implementation of the right to consultation,
participation and prior, free and informed consent of indigenous peoples in all negotiation
processes, and in the design and implementation of measures related to climate change.
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Environmental degradation and climate change are currently reaching critical levels, and
one of the main consequences of this is domestic and international migration. According
to projections, there were already about 25 million climate migrants by 1995. Current
estimates are around 50 million, and projections suggest that between 200 million and 1
billion people will become displaced by situations resulting from climate change by the
year 2050.
Developed countries should assume responsibility for climate migrants, welcoming them
into their territories and recognizing their fundamental rights through the signing of
international conventions that provide for the definition of climate migrant and require all
States to abide by abide by determinations.
Establish an International Tribunal of Conscience to denounce, make visible, document,
judge and punish violations of the rights of migrants, refugees and displaced persons
within countries of origin, transit and destination, clearly identifying the responsibilities
of States, companies and other agents.
Current funding directed toward developing countries for climate change and the
proposal of the Copenhagen Accord are insignificant. In addition to Official
Development Assistance and public sources, developed countries must commit to a new
annual funding of at least 6% of GDP to tackle climate change in developing countries.
This is viable considering that a similar amount is spent on national defense, and that 5
times more have been put forth to rescue failing banks and speculators, which raises
serious questions about global priorities and political will. This funding should be direct
and free of conditions, and should not interfere with the national sovereignty or selfdetermination of the most affected communities and groups.
In view of the inefficiency of the current mechanism, a new funding mechanism should
be established at the 2010 Climate Change Conference in Mexico, functioning under the
authority of the Conference of the Parties (COP) under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and held accountable to it, with significant representation
of developing countries, to ensure compliance with the funding commitments of Annex 1
countries.
It has been stated that developed countries significantly increased their emissions in the
period from 1990 to 2007, despite having stated that the reduction would be substantially
supported by market mechanisms.
The carbon market has become a lucrative business, commodifying our Mother Earth. It
is therefore not an alternative for tackle climate change, as it loots and ravages the land,
water, and even life itself.
The recent financial crisis has demonstrated that the market is incapable of regulating the
financial system, which is fragile and uncertain due to speculation and the emergence of
intermediary brokers. Therefore, it would be totally irresponsible to leave in their hands
the care and protection of human existence and of our Mother Earth.
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We consider inadmissible that current negotiations propose the creation of new
mechanisms that extend and promote the carbon market, for existing mechanisms have
not resolved the problem of climate change nor led to real and direct actions to reduce
greenhouse gases. It is necessary to demand fulfillment of the commitments assumed by
developed countries under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change regarding development and technology transfer, and to reject the “technology
showcase” proposed by developed countries that only markets technology. It is essential
to establish guidelines in order to create a multilateral and multidisciplinary mechanism
for participatory control, management, and evaluation of the exchange of technologies.
These technologies must be useful, clean and socially sound. Likewise, it is fundamental
to establish a fund for the financing and inventory of technologies that are appropriate
and free of intellectual property rights. Patents, in particular, should move from the hands
of private monopolies to the public domain in order to promote accessibility and low
costs.
Knowledge is universal, and should for no reason be the object of private property or
private use, nor should its application in the form of technology. Developed countries
have a responsibility to share their technology with developing countries, to build
research centers in developing countries for the creation of technologies and innovations,
and defend and promote their development and application for “living well.” The world
must recover and re-learn ancestral principles and approaches from native peoples to stop
the destruction of the planet, as well as promote ancestral practices, knowledge and
spirituality to recuperate the capacity for “living well” in harmony with Mother Earth.
Considering the lack of political will on the part of developed countries to effectively
comply with commitments and obligations assumed under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, and given the lack of a legal
international organism to guard against and sanction climate and environmental crimes
that violate the Rights of Mother Earth and humanity, we demand the creation of an
International Climate and Environmental Justice Tribunal that has the legal capacity to
prevent, judge and penalize States, industries and people that by commission or omission
contaminate and provoke climate change.
Supporting States that present claims at the International Climate and Environmental
Justice Tribunal against developed countries that fail to comply with commitments under
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol
including commitments to reduce greenhouse gases.
We urge peoples to propose and promote deep reform within the United Nations, so that
all member States comply with the decisions of the International Climate and
Environmental Justice Tribunal.
The future of humanity is in danger, and we cannot allow a group of leaders from
developed countries to decide for all countries as they tried unsuccessfully to do at the
Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen. This decision concerns us all. Thus, it is
essential to carry out a global referendum or popular consultation on climate change in
which all are consulted regarding the following issues; the level of emission reductions
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on the part of developed countries and transnational corporations, financing to be offered
by developed countries, the creation of an International Climate Justice Tribunal, the
need for a Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth, and the need to change
the current capitalist system. The process of a global referendum or popular consultation
will depend on process of preparation that ensures the successful development of the
same.
In order to coordinate our international action and implement the results of this “Accord
of the Peoples,” we call for the building of a Global People’s Movement for Mother
Earth, which should be based on the principles of complementarity and respect for the
diversity of origin and visions among its members, constituting a broad and democratic
space for coordination and joint worldwide actions.
To this end, we adopt the attached global plan of action so that in Mexico, the developed
countries listed in Annex 1 respect the existing legal framework and reduce their
greenhouse gases emissions by 50%, and that the different proposals contained in this
Agreement are adopted.
Finally, we agree to undertake a Second World People’s Conference on Climate Change
and the Rights of Mother Earth in 2011 as part of this process of building the Global
People’s Movement for Mother Earth and reacting to the outcomes of the Climate
Change Conference to be held at the end of this year in Cancun, Mexico.

